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I. STATUS
A. CEREMONIAL MARRIAGE
N 1969 the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas recom-
mended that a ceremonial marriage not be conducted until three days
had passed after the marriage license had been granted in order to
allow a couple to reflect on their desire to marry.1 The legislature de-
clined to accept the recommendation largely, it seemed, because of a per-
vasive tradition of a natural right to marry without delay. That was a time
when couples contemplating marriage rarely cohabitated prior to their
wedding except in secret. Now, of course, premarital mores have
changed considerably.
At the behest of some justices of the peace, whose courts are not lo-
cated near the marriage licensing office, the legislature provided in 1987
for a three-day waiting period for a ceremonial marriage after a marriage
license is issued. 2 That provision allowed for written waivers by a district
court and in 1989 the power of waiver was extended to statutory county
courts with family law jurisdiction. 3 The provision for waivers was pre-
sumably meant to make waivers somewhat difficult to get. In practice,
however, waivers have been routinely easy to acquire, often without any
personal appearance before the court. At the 1995 legislative session the
legislature extended the power of granting waivers to a supreme court
justice, a judge of the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of a court of
appeals. 4 Undelayed marriage has thus come almost full circle, and the
waiting period and its counterpart in section 2.485 should be repealed as
serving no useful purpose.
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
To deter the introduction of damaging evidence the defense in State v.
Mireles6 invoked the privilege of confidential spousal communication and
was therefore required to prove that the woman who heard the state-
1. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on Texas Family Code, Title 1, 21 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 911, 933 (1990).
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.82(c)(2) (Vernon 1993).
3. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.82(d)(2) (Vernon 1993).
4. Id.
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.48 (Vernon 1993).
6. 904 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref'd).
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ments of the accused was his wife. For almost a year before the commis-
sion of the acts of which the prisoner was accused, he and the woman had
cohabited as a married couple but had not entered into a ceremonial mar-
riage. Although the woman had testified that she did not consider herself
"married" to the man, she had subsequently brought a suit for divorce
against him in which the marriage was alleged, and she had used his sur-
name on letters written to him. 7 In light of these public acknowledg-
ments the trial court evidently interpreted the woman's testimony (not
clarified on cross-examination) to mean merely that she had not been
ceremonially married to the accused.8 The accused nevertheless regarded
himself as married to her, and the trial judge so found. On appeal the
court concluded that the trial judge might have inferred an agreement to
marry, and the appellate court was loath to upset the trial judge's conclu-
sion that the elements of an informal marriage had been proved.9 The
appellate court, moreover, was as imprecise in its review of the matter as
the trial court had been in its prior consideration.
In Mireles the prosecution went on to argue that the reliance of the
accused on the informal marriage failed because it was not asserted
within one year after the time the parties had separated as required by
the 1989 amendment to section 1.91(b) of the Family Code. 10 The court
rejected this argument on the ground that such a statute of limitations
was not applicable to a defensive plea which operated to negate the
state's proffered evidence." Not long after the decision in Mireles, a fed-
eral court held that the Texas statute imposing a one-year limitation pe-
riod in which to prove a common law marriage was invalid because it
violated the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution because
the one-year period is too short a time.' 2
In Musick v. Rex13 a woman was ceremonially married to X in 1979,
and while engaged in a suit for divorce from X was ceremonially married
to Y in late 1986. The divorce from X was granted one month after the
marriage to Y, and the cohabital relationship with Y continued thereaf-
7. Id. at 888.
8. In this respect the appellate court's handling of the issue of informal marriage was
much like that of the Texas Supreme Court in Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d
164, 167 (Tex. 1981), and it was similarly lacking in explanation. Compare the resolution of
the issues in Mireles with the courts' handling of Welch v. State, 908 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1995, no pet. h.), and Quinonez-Saa v. State, 860 S.W.2d 704, 709-710 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd.).
9. Mireles, 904 S.W.2d at 888.
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1996).
11. Mireles, 904 S.W.2d at 889. On the other hand the court said that if the evidence
of the informal marriage had been offered to show an independent claim of the accused,
the statute of limitation would have barred the proof of the accused. Id. (citing Morriss-
Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91 S.W.2d 313 (1936)).
12. White v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Cf
Donnelley v. Almond, 827 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no
writ) (holding the one-year limitation period did not violate the equal protection clause of
the Texas Constitution).
13. No. 08-95-00055-CV, 1995 WL 289651 (Tex. App.-El Paso, May 11, 1995, no writ)(ordered not to be published) (on file with author).
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ter. The woman had apparently separated from Y sometime before she
began cohabitating with Z in late 1992. The affair with Z ended in early
1994, a little more than a year before she asserted her informal marriage
to Z. The El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that her assertion was
barred by the one-year's statute of limitation then in effect.' 4
The appellate court also commented on the validity of the woman's
prior marriage to Y as an impediment to her proof of the marriage to Z.15
Because the marriage to X was subsisting when the purported marriage
to Y was celebrated, there was no argument that the marriage to Y was
not initially invalid. The woman's counsel argued, however, that the mar-
riage to Y was at most an informal marriage and therefore irrelevant in
that she had not sought to establish its validity. The court concluded that
as a result of meeting the requirements of continued cohabitation and
public acknowledgment of the parties, the marriage of the woman to Y
became effective under section 2.22 of the Family Code. 16 The marriage
to Y was therefore still subsisting and barred proof of the alleged mar-
riage to Z apart from the effect of the statute of limitation.17
In 1995 the Legislature again amended Family Code section 1.91(b) to
provide that if an informal marriage is not asserted for a period of two
years after termination of the cohabital relationship, there is a presump-
tion of no agreement to marry between the parties. 18 The amendment
therefore not only extends the limitation period from one year to two
years but also allows the proponent of the informal marriage to overcome
a presumption that there was no agreement to marry. The presumption
can be rebutted in the usual manner of proving the agreement: the same
evidence as that used to prove cohabitation and public acknowledgment
of the marriage may be used by the finder of fact to show an agreement
to marry.' 9
C. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
Having concluded in Mireles that an informal marriage existed, the
court suppressed the statements made by the prisoner to his wife that
tended to prove the acts of which he was accused. 20 But the court af-
firmed the trial court's admission of the wife's testimony of acts of the
accused that she had observed in his company. 2'
14. Id. at *7.
15. Id. at *6.
16. Id. at *6. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1993).
17. Musick, 1995 WL 289651, at *6. But cf. Peter N. Swisher & Melanie D. Jones, The
Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 29 A.B.A. FAM. L.Q. 409 (1995) (subsequent mar-
riage raises very strong presumption that any former marriage was terminated by death,
annulment, or divorce).
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
19. Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 933-34 (Tex. 1993).





The state has long maintained standards to avoid nepotism in hiring
state employees and to guard against the use of state employment for
personal profit for employees. The rules dealing with the former are em-
bodied in the Government Code 22 and those as to the latter, in the Texas
Constitution. 23 Analysis of the law in both of these regards is more com-
monly found in opinions of the Texas Attorney General than in judicial
decisions.
A recent opinion illustrates the operation of the current safeguards
against nepotism in hiring state employees.24 At the time the mayor of a
small incorporated city was elected in 1989, his wife had been employed
since 1987 as an independent contractor to render daily services at an
hourly rate of employment on an oral contract. In 1991 the city em-
ployed the mayor's wife in a part-time position but at no increase in pay.
In 1995 the city sought advice as to whether the wife might be employed
in a full-time position. As the couple were related in the first degree of
affinity (that is, within the prohibited second degree of affinity under the
anti-nepotism act), 25 the Texas Attorney General's first concern was the
wife's employment in a part-time position in 1991. Because she had been
employed by the city for over six months when her husband was elected
mayor, the wife's hiring as a part-time employee in 1991 was proper.2
6
As to her being hired for a full-time position in 1995, the city commission
may make such a decision provided that her husband does not participate
in any deliberations concerning it.27
The negative application of these rules is nicely illustrated by another
opinion of the Texas Attorney General.28 In that instance a county attor-
ney had served in an elective position since 1985. In 1995 he married a
member of his staff who had served in that capacity since 1993. The
county attorney sought an opinion as to his wife's continued employment
over which the county attorney had sole authority. 29 It is presumed that
an employer (the county attorney in this instance) "makes a new decision
each month to retain.., employees" paid on a monthly basis. 30 Because
the employee was not the county attorney's wife while employed prior to
22. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 573 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1996). In 1995 general ex-
ceptions as to offices affected by the anti-nepotism rule were modestly expanded. See TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.061 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
23. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 18 (1876, amended 1968).
24. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-015 (1995).
25. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 573.002, 573.041 (Vernon 1994).
26. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.062(a) (Vernon 1994); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
DM-76 (1992); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-861 (1988) at 2.
27. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-015 (1995) at 3; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.062(b) (Vernon
1994).
28. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-070 (1995).
29. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 151.001 (Vernon 1988); Commissioner Court v.
Ross, 809 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ) (hiring of deputies by a sheriff
are solely within the sheriff's power).
30. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-070 (1995) at 2 (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-286 (1980)
and Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-114 (1993)).
1996] 1019
SMU LAW REVIEW
her husband's election and until her marriage, her employment was not
excepted from the nepotism-exclusion rule, 31 and her further employ-
ment after her marriage is forbidden. 32
Another opinion illustrates the application of the rule concerning de-
grees of affinity. 33 An elected district attorney sought an opinion as to
the propriety of hiring his ex-wife's nephew as an assistant. Under sec-
tion 573.024(b) of the Government Code 34 the prohibited degrees of af-
finity apply to relatives of a divorced spouse provided that the ex-spouses
have a living child, as was the case in this instance. But because the rela-
tionship between the employer and the prospective employee was in the
third degree and thus beyond the prohibited second degree of affinity, the
employment was allowed. 35
In another inquiry a state senator sought an opinion with respect to a
business transaction in which her husband was an interested party.36 The
husband held community stock in a corporation that sought to sell certain
real property to a prospective buyer interested in entering into a transac-
tion with the state concerning the land after its purchase. The Texas At-
torney General expressed the opinion that there would be no violation of
the Texas Constitution 37 in this regard because neither the state senator
nor her husband would have any interest in the land once the sale was
completed. 38
E. Loss OF CONSORTIUM
In Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc.39 a husband sued for defamation
and his wife sued for loss of consortium as a result of the consequential
emotional distress that he had suffered. The trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the wife's suit.40 Because her
asserted claim had not resulted from her husband's physical injury, the
appellate court affirmed the judgment against the wife: In the absence of
physical injury to a tort-victim, the victim's spouse cannot assert a cause
of action for loss of consortium. 41
31. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.062 (1994).
32. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-070 (1995) at 3.
33. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-020 (1995). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 1831, 1831-32 (1992), on the manner of
counting degrees of relationships generally.
34. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 573.024(b) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1996). In 1995 this
rule was limited to living children under 21 in the case of a member of a board of trustees
or an officer of a school district, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.024(c) (Vernon Supp.
1996), passed in apparent response to Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-039 (1994).
35. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-020 (1995) at 2.
36. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-033 (1995).
37. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 18 (1876, amended 1968).
38. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-033 (1995) at 3-4 (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-782
(1987) at 3).
39. 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
40. Id.




F. INTERFERENCE WITH A SPOUSE'S PERSONAL RIGHTS
There is no reason that one spouse can not bring an action against the
other for intentionally causing the complainant emotional distress with-
out also suing for divorce, though it may be anticipated that a counter suit
for divorce may be thereby provoked. Nor is it now questioned that a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be
joined with a suit for divorce. That point was amply demonstrated in
Twyman v. Twyman 42 and Massey v. Massey.43 Whether failure to join
such a cause of action for emotional distress in a suit for divorce pre-
cludes a later independent assertion of that cause was broached but ap-
parently not pursued in Newton v. Newton. 4
Complaints for emotional distress in violation of the state and federal
wire-tap statutes45 were before the court of appeals in two divorce cases,
Parker v. Parker46 and Collins v. Collins.47 A proper objection to evi-
dence gained by wiretaps in contravention of either statute will bar its
admissibility. 48 In Parker the trial court awarded the wife $2,000 for elec-
tronic eavesdropping under state law49 and $1,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 50 The husband was guilty of particularly flagrant conduct in
bugging the office of his wife's attorney to break through her attorney-
client privilege in order to achieve an improper advantage in the trial. In
rejecting the husband's assertion that the damage award was excessive,
the court stressed that a major purpose of awarding punitive damages in
Texas is "to punish and deter wrongful conduct. ' '51 If that is so, one
would think that the state should make some effort toward publicizing
such awards. Though this journal strives to assist as it can in this regard,
one wonders whether some readers were unaware of the award before
being appraised of it here.
In Moreno v. Moore52 the court of appeals held the trial court's grant-
ing of a protective order against the wife when the husband did not file an
42. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
43. 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993).
44. 895 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.). In Parker v. Parker,
897 S.W.2d 918, 925, 931 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied), another panel of the
same court disposed of a plea of res judicata made to a cause of action asserted in a divorce
case but properly preserved in a later phase of the same case.
45. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 123.001-.004 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1996);
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
46. Parker, 897 S.W.2d at 926-27.
47. 904 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied per curiam).
48. Id. at 798. In both Collins, 904 S.W.2d at 804, and Parker, 897 S.W.2d at 928-29,
the courts commented on the applicability of the statute of limitation to the state wiretap
statute. In Collins the court concluded that the two-year tort statute is controlling. Collins,
904 S.W.2d at 804. In Parker the court pointed out that the running of the statute of
limitation is tolled by the process of discovery to investigate a rumor of eavesdropping. To
achieve applicability of this discovery-rule the party asserting it must plead it affirmatively
or show that its application at trial was by consent. Parker, 897 S.W.2d at 929.
49. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 123.004 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1996).
50. Parker, 897 S.W.2d at 929-30.
51. Id. at 930.
52. 897 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, n.w.h.).
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application for a protective order was improper.5 3 The wife had re-
quested a protective order against the husband but the trial court, over
the wife's objection, entered a mutual protective order in which both the
husband and wife were subject to protective orders against each other.54
The court found that the trial court did not comply with section 71.121 of
the Texas Family Code,55 which requires an agreement between the par-
ties before a joint protective order is issued. In the absence of such an
agreement, the court cannot issue a protective order against a party un-
less there is an application for that relief.
G. INTRAFAMILIAL INSURANCE
In 1993 the Texas Supreme Court held in National County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Johnson56 that a family-member-exclusion clause in an
automobile liability policy is invalid as against the public policy enunci-
ated by the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act.57 Thus, a
driver of a motor vehicle is not allowed to be left uninsured by an auto-
mobile liability policy with respect to claims asserted against him by
members of his own family.58 In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company
v. Sanford59 the Texas Supreme Court made it clear that the invalidity of
the family-member-exclusion clause determined in Johnson operates only
in so far as a clause conflicts with the minimum of automobile liability
insurance imposed by the act.60
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. COMMUNITY PRESUMPTION
The presumption that all property possessed by spouses during a mar-
riage is community property6 is ordinarily the starting point in character-
ization disputes. In Panozzo v. Panozzo62 the court of appeals found that
the divorce court erred in failing to observe the limits of the presumption.
The couple's residence, their car, their household furnishings, appliances,
clothing and other personal effects, bank accounts, pension and profit
sharing plans, and life insurance policies were all presumed to be commu-
nity property and no evidence was offered to refute that characteriza-
tion.63 The wife went on to allege that a large quantity of commercial
equipment was also community property but failed to show that the
53. Id. at 442.
54. Id. at 441.
55. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.121 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
56. 879 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1993).
57. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, § 1(10), 1A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (codi-
fied at TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 601 (Vernon 1996)).
58. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d at 5.
59. 879 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
60. Id. at 10.
61. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1993).
62. 904 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, n.w.h.).
63. Id. at 786.
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equipment was possessed or owned by either spouse during the marriage.
The trial court's application of the community presumption to that equip-
ment was therefore erroneous.64
B. TRACING SEPARATE PROPERTY
In two instances wives sought to rebut the community presumption by
tracing property on hand at the time of divorce to their separate property.
In one instance65 the wife convinced the trial court that certain assets
were her separate property because they were traceable to sales of timber
from her separate land, but the appellate court pointed out that as pro-
ceeds of products of separate land such property constituted community
assets.66 The trial court had also erred in characterizing funds emanating
from earned employment benefits 67 as separate property. In the other
instance68 the wife was successful in tracing assets to property owned by
her prior to marriage and thus it was her separate property. In reaching
its conclusion the Fort Worth Court of Appeals discussed the appropriate
standard of review for appellate courts when the burden of proof at trial
demands clear and convincing evidence. 69
C. RETIREMENT BENEFITS FROM THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGN
On June 25, 1981 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Mc-
Carty v. McCarty70 that military retirement benefits were meant by Con-
gress to be enjoyed by the pensioner alone and not by his or her spouse,
and it thus seemed that until Congress otherwise provided, military re-
tirement benefits already received belonged to the pensioner. In 1982
Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection
Act (USFSPA)71 to allow division on divorce under state law received
after June 25, 1981 of military retirement benefits. Because it was unclear
whether Congress intended the rule change to affect divorces that were
rendered before June 26, 1981, Congress amended the USFSPA on No-
vember 5, 1990 to provide that for divorces rendered prior to June 25,
64. Id.
65. McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
n.w.h.).
66. Id. at 188-89 (citing White v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 26 Tex. 195, 196 (1862)).
67. Id. (retirement, annuity, disability, and pension benefits).
68. Faram v. Gervitz-Faram, 895 S.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995,
n.w.h.).
69. Id. at 843. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conclusion
reached by the trial court, the court in Bloomer v. Bloomer, No. 01-91-01428-CV, 1995 WL
631457 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 26, 1995, n.w.h.) (not designated for publica-
tion), on motion for rehearing unanimously reached a conclusion very different from that it
had previously reached in Bloomer v. Bloomer, No. 01-91-01428-CV, 1993 WL 459911
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 1993) (not designated for publication).
70. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
71. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (1983) (effective Feb. 1, 1983).
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198172 partitions of benefits should not be allowed. 73 The amendment,
however, provided with respect to judgments entered between June 25,
1981 (post McCarty) and November 5, 1990 (date of the amendment) that
payments not end until November 5, 1992.74
As a consequence familiar litigants were again before an appellate
court in Trahan v. Trahan.75 The Trahans were divorced in 1971 but the
court made no division of the husband's military retirement benefits. Af-
ter the ex-husband retired, the ex-wife sought and received an order for
partition of his retirement benefits in 1977, which order was modified by
the intermediate appellate court.76 While the ex-husband's writ of error
was pending before the Texas Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court decided the McCarty case, and the Trahan partition was reversed. 77
After the congressional act of 1982 became effective, the ex-wife again
filed suit for partition of the retirement benefits paid after June 25, 1981,
and her suit was successful. 78 In 1993, under the authority of the congres-
sional act of 1990, the ex-husband sought and was awarded suspension of
payments of his benefits to his ex-wife as of November 5, 1992.79 In re-
viewing the trial court's decision, the Austin Court of Appeals held that
the doctrine of res judicata barred reopening of the issue of whether the
ex-wife had a right of partition.80 The court concluded that the 1982 con-
gressional act was not meant to allow subsequent partitions of retirement
benefits in cases decided before the decision in McCarty in which a parti-
tion had not been made. 81 But the court did not regard the 1982 act as
dispositive of cases under the 1990 act which expressly provided for retro-
spective application. 82 The court concluded that the 1983 judgment in
favor of the ex-wife, affirmed on appeal in 1984, gave her a vested right to
the ex-husband's military retirement benefits from September 30, 1983,
when the judgment of the trial court was rendered, and res judicata
barred reopening of the issue of whether she possessed that right. In the
court's view, the subsequent amendment to the USFSPA did not affect
that judgment however retrospective the amendment may have been in-
tended to be.83
72. Congress should have said "prior to June 26, 1981."
73. Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 1062(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1475 (1991), codified as 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 1408(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
74. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(1).
75. 894 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
76. Trahan v. Trahan, 609 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980), rev'd, 626
S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981).
77. Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981).
78. Trahan v. Trahan, 682 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), ap-
peal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986) (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question).
79. Trahan v. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
80. Id. at 119.
81. Id. at 116 (citing John B. McKnight, Comment, Closing the McCarty-USFSPA
Window: A Proposal for Relief from McCarty-Era Final Judgments, 63 TEX. L. REV. 497,
512 (1984)).
82. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d at 116.
83. Id. at 119.
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The Amarillo Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Ex
parte Kruse.84 The couple's divorce was granted in 1979 without any divi-
sion of the husband's military retirement benefits. To settle the ex-wife's
claim for benefits under the 1982 Congressional act, the court in 1988
entered an agreed order to partition the benefits, and the ex-husband was
ordered to pay his ex-wife a specific amount of monthly benefits received
unless she received those payments directly from the military service.
Payments were made to her by the Air Force until May 1, 1991 when she
was notified that she was not authorized to receive direct payments. The
ex-husband nevertheless continued to pay her until July, 1994 when he
ceased paying. The ex-wife filed a motion for contempt for violating the
order and the ex-husband was confined to jail until he paid the arrears
due.8 5 The ex-husband brought a writ of habeas corpus to the Amarillo
Court of Appeals for his release. The relator asserted that under the 1990
amendment of the USFSPA the 1988 order was void. 86 The court con-
cluded that the doctrine of res judicata bars a collateral attack on the
unappealed order of 1988.87 Thus, the ex-husband's position in Kruse
was substantially the same as the ex-husband's stance in Trahan: Even
though the 1990 amendment to the USFSPA clarified Congress's intent
not to allow partitions of retirement benefits in divorces granted prior to
McCarty (June 25, 1981), partition judgments related to such pre-Mc-
Carty divorces rendered prior to the 1990 amendment (e.g. Trahan 1984
and Kruse 1988) would not be distributed on the grounds of res judicata.
The court in Kruse was careful to distinguish Buys v. Buys88 in which the
San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the 1990 amendment barred the
ex-wife's attempt to partition military retirement benefits undivided in a
1980 divorce decree.89
D. BUSINESS TRANSACTION INVOLVING SEPARATE PROPERTY
In re Louis90 involved a transaction presenting considerable conceptual
difficulty seemingly resulting from an insufficiency of fact concerning the
initial understanding of the parties. Along with his wife, the husband and
his sister contracted with the United States Postal Service in 1988 to con-
struct a building on land inherited by the husband and sister. The Postal
Service agreed to lend the money necessary to construct the building, and
all three signed a note for the loan. After the building was completed in
1989, the Postal Service occupied the building and began making pay-
ments on a ten-year lease. The wife had expended considerable time and
84. 911 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, n.w.h.). The Amarillo court cited but
did not specifically rely on the Trahan decision of the Austin court. Id. at 841.
85. Id. at 840.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 841.
88. 898 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ granted). See also Jones v.
Jones, 900 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (res judicata barred attack
on division of husband's disability benefits).
89. Kruse, 911 S.W.2d at 841.
90. 911 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
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effort in preparing and managing the lease prior to filing for divorce in
1994. Despite a contrary conclusion on the part of the trial court, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals found inadequate evidence to show a joint
venture in which the wife would share the profits of the transaction 9' and
remanded the case for redivision of the property.
E. PREMARITAL GIFr
In Louis the trial court also found that the parties' home was the wife's
separate property which she had received in a divorce-settlement with
her prior husband, whom she had promised to pay for his community
interest in the property. 92 Shortly before her second marriage the wife's
husband-to-be supplied her with the money to discharge the debt to her
former husband. In the wife's divorce from her second husband, the trial
court held that the house from her first marriage was the wife's separate
property. The appellate court held that the trial court might have reason-
ably concluded that the money supplied by the second husband prior to
marriage was a gift and thus the trial court's characterization of the prop-
erty could be sustained.93 But if the money supplied prior to their mar-
riage to discharge the debt did not constitute a gift, it must have been a
loan. If so, the property would still have been the wife's separate estate.
In either case, the money supplied to pay the debt could not be construed
as a marital advancement because the couple was not then married.
Thus, the doctrine of marital reimbursement could not have been applica-
ble to this situation.
In Leighton v. Leighton,94 the wife asserted that her husband had given
her a half interest in a ranch which was the husband's separate property
acquired before marriage. Shortly after the couple's marriage in 1978
they jointly executed an installment note and deed of trust to build a
home on the ranch. After the parties separated in 1991, the wife, who
was apparently living in the home, continued to make loan payments to
the bank and to pay property taxes and insurance. The husband denied
giving the wife an interest in the ranch. The trial court found that by
executing the deed of trust the parties had effectively sold the property to
the trustee and thereby created a "resulting trust. '95 Thus, the trial court
concluded that the ranch was community property and awarded the wife
a half interest in it.96
The Houston First District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded;
the ranch was not acquired with borrowed funds but was only improved
with borrowed funds.97 "Once separate property character attaches, that
character does not change because community funds are spent to im-
91. Id. at 497.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 921 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.).
95. Id. at 367.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 368.
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prove the property. In addition, the character of property does not
change because both parties sign a note, or because the names of both
parties are on the deed of trust. '98 The court recognized community re-
imbursement as the appropriate remedy when separate property is im-
proved with community funds and noted further that a right of
reimbursement does not create an interest in the land.99
F. FORGIVENESS OF DEBT
If a debt owed by a spouse is gratuitously cancelled by the creditor, the
debtor-spouse thereby receives a personal benefit in the nature of a gift.
But the consequences of the transaction may tend to be exaggerated. In
Abernathy v. Fehlis'00 the husband and wife received a loan from the hus-
band's father to assist them in buying a house, in the purchase of which
they executed a note to the father for $45,000 and gave him a deed of
trust lien on the house. At the time of the father's death, $2,000 had been
repaid on the note. In his will the father forgave the indebtedness to the
husband, and the father's executor thereupon assigned the deed of trust
lien to the husband. In their divorce the trial court awarded the home to
the wife free of all liens but went on to state that the mortgage was the
husband's separate property o10 and that he was required to discharge the
mortgage and relieve the wife of liability on it. 102
Putting aside the husband's arguments with respect to the trial court's
abuse of discretion in dividing the property, it is clear that the house was
a community improvement on community land, and the father's cancella-
tion of the husband's indebtedness had no bearing on that conclusion.
The record, however, did not reveal whether the note was a negotiable
instrument or a mere contract to pay. Nor was it explained by the court
why the father's executor assigned the deed of trust lien to the husband in
furtherance of the father's testamentary cancellation of the debt owed by
his son and his wife. The effect of the cancellation was that no debt was
owed by either spouse. If the note were negotiable, the court said, the
Texas Uniform Commercial Code disposed of the debt issue: The "as-
signment of the lien, which necessarily carried with it a right in [the hus-
band] to have possession of the promissory note, effected a release of [the
wife] as well as [the husband] irrespective of the father's intention in the
matter. '1 03 Thus, if the father meant to excuse the indebtedness, the hus-
band and wife were both released from personal liability. From the hus-
band's point of view he got a separate benefit from his father's estate
which he was unable to turn to his advantage in the divorce. The court
98. Id. (citation omitted).
99. Id.
100. 911 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, n.w.h.).
101. Id. at 847.
102. Id. at 846.
103. Id. at 847 n.1 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.601(2)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1996) (liability of all parties discharged when party who has himself no right of action or
recourse on instrument reacquires it)).
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went on to say that if the note had not been a negotiable instrument, the
wife would not have been released as an obliger unless she showed that
the father meant to assign the lien to the husband with an intention to
discharge both the husband and the wife. 104
If the loan from the father had been structured somewhat differently, a
different result could have been achieved. If the husband had given his
father a note to buy the house and his father had contracted to look only
to the son's separate property for payment, the reimbursement right re-
lated to the house would have been the husband's separate right and the
forgiveness of the debt would have benefited the husband solely. That
may have been what the father had in mind, but if it was, the transaction
was not so structured to achieve the father's objective.
G. GIFT IN TRUST
Having brought suit for divorce, the husband in Cleaver v. George
Staton Company, Inc.10 5 brought an independent suit against the trustees
of a trust from which the wife was entitled to mandatory payments of
income. In reaching the conclusion that the husband lacked standing to
sue the trustees, the appellate court explained that the wife's right to re-
ceive the trust income was her only present interest in the property and
therefore was her separate property entitlement.'0 6 The point has been
put somewhat differently: that the income is the subject matter of the gift
of which the beneficiary has present enjoyment, though the beneficiary
may ultimately benefit in other ways. 107
The court in Cleaver went on to say that if it were asserted that the
wife's failure to pursue her claim against the trustee for non-payment of
income thereby constructively defrauded the community estate of interest
on the trust income, the husband might be entitled to a share of that
community reimbursement claim under Belz v. Belz. 0 8
H. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN A RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT AND
RECOVERY FOR TORTIOUS INJURY
The catchword describing many claims for reimbursement involving a
unilateral gratuitous disposition of community property is constructive
fraud. In In re Moore'0 9 the court made it plain that such an allegation of
fraud in a suit for divorce does not constitute an independent cause of
104. Abernathy, 911 S.W.2d 845, 847 n.1.
105. 908 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ denied).
106. Id. at 470 (citing In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 717-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ)).
107. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 6 (1983).
108. Cleaver, 908 S.W.2d at 471 (citing Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). In some instances, such as negotiation of a property settle-
ment agreement after a suit for divorce has been commenced, the ordinary rules of fiduci-
ary duty cease to operate. Parker v. Parker, 897 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1995, writ denied).
109. 890 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
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action which will support damage-recovery for fraud or related mental
anguish. 110 A gratuitous disposition with intent to harm (actual fraud)
must be distinguished from an unreasonable disposition (albeit gratui-
tous) of solely managed community assets (constructive fraud). "[A]n al-
legation of breach of fiduciary duty in a divorce context and a claim of
fraud on the community are the same creature . . . ."111 and as such will
not support an independent cause of action in a suit for divorce. 112
Although a divorce court may award a money judgment as a means of
rectifying the loss, such an award does not constitute damages for an in-
dependent wrong. The court particularly relied on Belz v. Belz.113 The
court pointed out that in the absence of an independent cause of action
(such as one for actual fraud), there can be no recovery for mental
anguish." 4
I. INTERSPOUSAL Girr
If one spouse desires to give the other the entire title to an item of
community property, the appropriate way to achieve the desired result is
for the manager of the property to transfer the entire interest.115 If the
wife or husband is the sole manager of the property, that spouse should
transfer the whole of it to the other. If both spouses are joint managers
of the property, both should join in making the transfer of the entire in-
terest to the donee-spouse. It should be noted that the donee-spouse's
tax basis in the part of the property already owned would not be affected
by either mode of transfer.1 16 This is not to say that some other mode of
transfer may produce the same result, but avoiding the cost of litigation in
order to be assured of good title should outweigh experiments with other
devices.
In In re Morrison"1 7 the Texarkana Court of Appeals approved an al-
ternative device, but the facts required to show that it is appropriate to
the circumstances discourage its usefulness. The husband and wife had
purchased a rent house in 1991 and in 1992 the husband executed a deed
to the wife of all of his interest in the property. In their divorce in 1994
the trial court concluded that the attempted transfer was ineffective be-
cause the couple had not partitioned the property prior to the transfer.
Hence, the property was treated as part of the community estate and the
110. Id. at 829-30.
111. Id. at 827.
112. Id. at 827-30.
113. 667 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref. n.r.e.). The court in In re
Moore found no contrary authority in Swisher v. Swisher, 190 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1945, no writ), and Fanning v. Fanning, 828 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1992), aff'd, as modified, 847 SW.2d 225, 226 (Tex. 1993). Id. at 828-29. The de-
scription of the award as "damages" in Mazique v. Mazique, 742 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), may be regarded as merely colloquial usage.
114. In re Moore, 890 S.W.2d at 830.
115. In re Morrison, 913 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
116. See Jones v. State, 5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Com'n App. 1928, holding approved).
117. 913 S.W.2d at 689.
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court divided it equally between the spouses. Under the facts of the case
the property was clearly subject to joint management of the spouses.
Although it is generally agreed that neither spouse acting alone and with-
out the concurrence of the other spouse may make an effective disposi-
tion of all or part of jointly managed community property, 118 the
Texarkana Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that if one spouse
conveys his or her community interest to the other with the mutual un-
derstanding that the grantee will hold the entire property as separate es-
tate, a gift has been effectively made of the grantor's interest to the
grantee and the entire property is therefore the grantee's separate prop-
erty.119 The court was careful to point out that reimbursement might
nonetheless be sought by the husband in such a case for community im-
provements made on the property subsequent to the transfer.' 20
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL
PROPERTY
A. ASSIGNMENT OF MALPRACTICE CLAIM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Miller v. Miller,'2' a divorce case decided by the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals in 1984, has acquired some familiarity for exploring, if not fully de-
fining, the fiduciary duty between spouses in the sole management of
community property. Simultaneously with the divorce case and after its
conclusion, four further suits have been litigated between the parties. In
the settlement of the penultimate of these, the ex-husband assigned his
ex-wife any malpractice claim that he might have had against his counsel,
and that claim inter alia was finally resolved in the fifth and last suit,
White v. InteCom, Inc.122 There the Austin Court of Appeals held on the
authority of Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon 23 that a malpractice
claim is unassignable in Texas. 124
B. SPOUSAL LIABILITY
The appellate courts continue to be called upon to correct spouses'
confusion concerning the nature and extent of spousal liability. Such con-
fusion usually arises in relation to a contract made by only one spouse. A
community liability ordinarily attaches to such a contract, and it is fre-
118. Id. at 692 (citing Dalton v. Don J. Jackson, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1985, no writ)). But the court noted the contrary conclusion in Vallone v. Miller,
663 S.W.2d 97,98 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.), and Williams v.
Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd).
Id.
119.. Id. at 693.
120. Id. at 693 n.3.
121. 700 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122. No. 93-94-00394-CV (Tex. App.-Austin, Sept. 13, 1995, writ denied) (not desig-
nated for publication).
123. 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref d). For a discussion
of this decision, see Amy E. Douthitt, Comment, Selling Your Attorney's Negligence:
Should Legal Malpractice Claims Be Assigned in Texas?, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 177 (1994).
124. White, No. 03-94-00394-CV at *7.
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quently, but inaccurately, thought that both spouses are always personally
liable on the contract. 125 The dispute that provoked the decision in Blake
v. Amoco Federal Credit Union, 26 on the other hand, stemmed from a
divorce decree that ordered the wife to pay a note made by both spouses
during marriage. In this situation both spouses are indeed initially liable
on the contract and both are subject to continuing personal liability,
though the wife was ordered to pay the debt. If she follows the order of
the court, the liability of both former spouses is discharged. In this in-
stance the creditor assigned the note, and the holder attempted to collect
the note from the ex-husband. The ex-husband thereupon brought suit
against the assigning creditor for failure to give its assignee notice of the
court-order that the ex-wife had been ordered to pay the debt. The credi-
tor was actually aware of this fact as a party to the divorce proceeding.
The divorce court, however, did not have power to release the ex-hus-
band from his obligation to pay the creditor (as persons in the ex-hus-
band's position frequently fail to understand), and having a right to
recover, the creditor had no duty to inform the assignee of the court's
order.' 27
In explaining the ex-husband's liability, the court misleadingly used the
term "community debt" to refer to both a joint obligation and a sole obli-
gation and cited inapposite authority.' 28 Although the court's ultimate
conclusion is correct, some of the underpinning for the court's reasoning
is faulty. 129
C. TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
In re Estate of Gibson130 dealt with the construction of a contractual
will made by spouses. The will expressly gave the surviving spouse a life
estate in certain property but not the absolute power to dispose of the
property after the death of the first to die. The dispute, however, con-
cerned the widow's gifts of property acquired after her husband's death.
The court pointed out that although the contractual will could have cov-
ered such further acquisitions,' 3 ' it failed to do so, and the property was
therefore subject to disposition by the survivor.' 32
125. See Inwood Nat'l Bank v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. 900 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
127. Id. at 112.
128. Inwood Nat'l Bank v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (wrongly decided because the court mistook sole liability for joint
liability). The Legislature therefore enacted TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031 (Vernon 1993)
to preclude repetition of the error.
129. For further confusion about "community debt," see Siefkas v. Siefkas, 902 S.W.2d
72, 76 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.); Rush v. Montgomery Ward, 757 S.W.2d 521, 523
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (discussed in Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 1, 18 (1989)).
130. 893 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ).
131. Id. at 752 (citing Knolle v. Hunt, 551 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
132. Id. at 752-53.
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Miller v. Wilson133 needs mention here merely because it contains a
dictum relating to management powers of spouses and others that is apt
to mislead the unwary. The misleading statement of the El Paso Court of
Appeals was that a "[t]estator could not grant authority to sell something
he does not own. ' 134 The statement is clearly inaccurate with respect to
property that the testator does not own when he makes his will but which
he acquires before his death. The view is sometimes expressed that one
cannot sell or otherwise deal with property that one does not own. But
this statement is also incorrect as is illustrated by Gibson and in situations
involving a sale of a future acquisition 35 and a disposition that puts a
legatee to an equitable election.' 36 The statement is also too broad with
respect to the doctrine of agency of necessity.137
In Bryant v. Flint138 the dispute arose out of a contract to settle a hus-
band's estate. Rather than disposing of something that she did not own,
the widow agreed to discharge a debt which she did owe. During their
marriage the husband and wife had filed joint income tax returns, which
at the time of the husband's death were in the course of audit by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). After the husband's death a dispute be-
tween the widow and the husband's executor culminated in an agreed
judgment between them that the widow would discharge one half of any
income tax liability. TWo years later a determination was made by the
IRS that the widow was entitled to treatment as an innocent spouse with
respect to certain undeclared income and therefore had no tax liability.
When the widow then refused to pay the agreed portion of the taxes, the
estate filed suit to enforce the contract. The court held that the widow
was liable. 139 The lesson to be learned from this conclusion is self-evi-
dent: The surviving spouse should be cautious in agreeing to pay debts for
which she is not clearly liable.
D. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
A homestead tenant has the duty to pay all ad valorem taxes, interest
on loans, insurance, and cost of maintenance in relation to a home-
stead. 140 In Copeland v. Tarrant Appraisal District'4 ' the local taxing au-
thority had denied a widower's request for a homestead tax-exemption
and he appealed. On her death the appellant's wife had devised her sepa-
133. 888 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, n.w.h.).
134. Id. at 161.
135. Hale v. Hollan, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W. 287 (1897).
136. See Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951); Wright v. Wright, 154
Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
137. See Smith v. Anna-Manna, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1964, no writ). It is notable in this regard that the court did not reject the wife's
right to pledge the freezer subject to the husband's sole management except on the author-
ity of the statute repealed in 1968.
138. 894 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
139. Id. at 401.
140. Sargeant v. Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 15 S.W.2d 589, 594 (1929).
141. 906 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.).
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rate property home to her son, but her surviving husband maintained his
constitutional right to occupy the property for life. 142 Because the surviv-
ing spouse's right to occupy the homestead is in the nature of a tenancy
for life and the Tax Code provides that "[real property owned by a life
tenant and remainderman shall be listed in the name of a life tenant,"1143
the appellate court held that the homestead tenant without legal title is
nonetheless entitled to a homestead tax exemption under the Tax
Code.1'"
A debtor filing for bankruptcy cannot assert a homestead claim effec-
tively if he has parted with it or has been finally deprived of his home-
stead claim before filing. In In re Robinson145 the irrevocable transfer of
the homestead property in trust constituted an abandonment of the
homestead even though the claimant had maintained occupancy of it. He
had disposed of his entire interest in the property on which the home-
stead claim depended. Conditional 146 and sham transfer cases147 are not
convincing authorities to the contrary. Nor will retention of proceeds of
sale of a homestead sustain its exempt status indefinitely. The proceeds
must be reinvested in a home within six months of the sale in order to
maintain the exemption. 148
The assertion of a homestead claim by an incompetent was discussed
by the Austin Court of Appeals in State v. Ellison.149 In 1987 the state
had obtained a judgment against a guardian for the care of his mentally
deficient ward, who had been in a state institution for almost thirty years.
To discharge the debt the court had ordered the sale of the ward's rural
realty which the guardian had leased for the ward's benefit. In 1991 a
further judgment was obtained by the state for the ward's care.150 Con-
cerned that the state facility might be closed, the guardian, at some time,
had installed a trailer home on the ward's property (on which he had
apparently never lived) so that the ward might live there with a caretaker
if need demanded.151 The guardian testified that in late 1993 he thought
142. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52.
143. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.05 (Vernon 1992).
144. Copeland, 906 S.W.2d at 151-52. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.130) (Vernon
Supp. 1996).
145. 180 B.R. 174 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
146. Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971); Moorhouse v. Crew, 273 S.W.2d
654 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd).
147. In re Moody, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Shamburger, 104 S.W.2d 112
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ).
148. In re Reed, 178 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). A new opinion was substituted
for the former one with the same citation noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1246 (1995).
149. 914 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, n.w.h.).
150. It does not appear, however, that the state abstracted either judgment. The Texas
Attorney General expressed the opinion that a valid abstract of judgment does not consti-
tute a cloud on the title of a debtor's homestead so that the judgment creditor is liable for
clouding the title, but a public authority with an abstract of judgment against a debtor may
execute a voluntary disclaimer of any present claim against the homestead. Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. DM-366 (1995).
151. Ellison, 914 S.W.2d at 684.
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that he had reached an agreement with the state whereby all of the ward's
realty except a homestead of one hundred acres would be sold to dis-
charge the judgments, 152 and in May, 1994 the guardian moved for judi-
cial recognition of the ward's homestead claim. The trial court
recognized the claim, and the state appealed. Although the state put
much emphasis on the 1987 order of sale and the guardian's failure to
assert his ward's homestead claim at that time, the appellate court found
no bar of estoppel or res judicata to deter the guardian's later assertion of
the homestead claim. Although the court concluded that the guardian
could and did establish a homestead on behalf of his ward, there is no
mention of the ward's occupancy of the premises, even vicariously. The
court therefore assumed the prevalence of a very liberal doctrine of
homestead designation. 153
The facts underlying the dispute in In re Camp154 are intricate and un-
likely to recur, and the court's conclusion is curious. Claiming title by
way of a bequest from her paternal grandmother, A had made her resi-
dence for six years in Blackacre. A's step mother-in-law B claimed
Blackacre under the will of A's father and had A evicted from Blackacre,
which B promptly sold to X by warranty deed. A then brought suit
against X for title to Blackacre and recovered the property and a money
judgment for X's occupancy of the premises.
X in turn sued B for breach of warranty of title to Blackacre. B failed
to answer, and the state court rendered a money judgment in favor of X
against B. X then began a post-judgment discovery proceeding against B
to find property against which he might levy execution. By way of inter-
rogatories X asked B to admit that she had abandoned her homestead
claim to Whiteacre, where she had lived for twenty-three years. When B
failed to answer the discovery request, the state court ordered her to an-
swer. When B failed to comply, X moved the court to penalize B's mis-
conduct. As sanctions the court thereupon entered an order that B had
admitted that she had abandoned any claim to Whiteacre as her home-
stead, that Whiteacre was not her homestead, and that she could not as-
sert any claim to Whiteacre as her homestead. The result it was said,
constituted abandonment of B's homestead by imposition of sanctions.
The court then issued a writ of execution against Whiteacre, which X
bought at the sheriff's sale and transferred the property to A in satisfac-
tion of her judgment.
B then filed a petition in bankruptcy asserting that Whiteacre (now
claimed by A under the conveyance from X) as her homestead. "The
bankruptcy court refused to give res judicata effect to the [state court's]
sanctions order .... ",155 The federal district judge affirmed the ruling of
152. The sequence of events is not very precisely set out in the opinion.
153. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, Sw. L.J. 65, 83-84 (1983).
154. 59 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 550. Anticipating that X might assert that the state court's sanctions order
should be given res judicata effect, B's counsel could have appealed the sanctions order.
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the bankruptcy court that the "post-judgment discovery proceeding is
simply not capable of overriding the protection afforded to homestead
claimants under the Texas Constitution."'156
On A's appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court was at
pains to show that all the elements for a holding of res judicata were
met. 157 The court first explained that the state court had jurisdiction in
the matter before it so that its ruling was not void but was at most voida-
ble if an appeal had been taken from it. The federal appellate court
therefore examined the jurisdiction of the state court to declare that
Whiteacre was not B's homestead. The federal court concluded that if
the sanctions order and "order of sale"'158 by the state court had caused a
forced sale of the homestead, the order would have been void. But the
order was saved from voidness by B's prior admission (by failure to re-
spond) of the fact that X had sought to prove: that Whiteacre was not B's
homestead. Having dealt with the jurisdiction of the Texas court at
length, the 'court went on to say that the court's order was final and that
the issue was the same as that before the bankruptcy court where the
same parties were before the court. Though A was not a party to X's
action against B in the strict sense, the fact that A was the assignee of X's
interest acquired in the action against B made A privy to that action. 159
Because the parties were thus deemed identical and the issues in dispute
were also identical, the post-judgment order of the state court had dis-
posed of all issues before it,160 and B's failure to appeal left that order in
effect.161
Despite the court's careful reasoning and extreme care on B's behalf
on the jurisdictional issue, one nagging point was not discussed: a troub-
ling analogy that may be drawn between the consequences of B's failure
to respond to X's interrogatories and a homestead claimant's forbidden
waiver of her homestead by tendering it for execution.1 62 This point is
surely as fundamental as the res-judicata-jurisdictional issue, even if the
parties to the two proceedings were the same on the basis of the construc-
tive privity argument. 163
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Sutherland v. Cobern, 843 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992,
writ denied).
158. The court appears to mean "order for levy of execution". Id. at 552 (citing Cline v.
Niblo, 117 Tex. 474, 8 S.W.2d 633, 638 (1928)). In either case, however, this conclusion
seems to go further than applicable law requires.
159. Camp, 59 F.3d at 555 n.17.
160. Id. at 555.
161. Id. at 555 n.18.
162. See Ross v. Lister, 14 Tex. 469, 473-74 (1855); see also Houston & Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Winter, 44 Tex. 597, 611 (1876).
163. Camp, 59 F.3d at 552, 555. One is also uncomfortable when a federal court relies
on procedural aspects of a Texas case for authority on a procedural point when that same
decision is of very questionable authority for a point of substantive law. The particular
procedural point for which Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover, 701 S.W.2d 24, 25




As the case was handled, however, B's failure to respond to X's inter-
rogatories apparently deserved sanction, but B's error was in not taking
an appeal from the state court's judgment. If B had taken a successful
appeal from that decision, B resort to the bankruptcy court could have
been avoid, at least insofar as the homestead claim was concerned.164
E. LIENS ON HOMESTEADS
Revised homestead lien provisions of the Texas Constitution 165 were
adopted on November 7, 1995. The Legislature had enacted amendments
to section 41.001(b) of the Property Code, effective from May 17, 1995,166
and other statutory provisions became effective with the constitutional
amendment. 167
The effective date of a constitutional amendment is not precisely de-
fined. Article XVII of the Texas Constitution is silent on the point be-
yond stating that "[i]f it appears from the returns that a majority of the
votes cast have been cast in favor of an amendment, it shall become a
part of this Constitution.. ."168 The Election Code provides for canvass-
ing of the vote for statewide measures by the Governor from the fifteenth
through the thirtieth days after and election 169 and his certification of the
tabulations are made to the Secretary of State.170 On November 7, 1995,
the amendment to article XVI, section 50 was voted on and the canvass
of December 1, 1995 showed that 51.4 percent of the voters favored the
amendment. The amendment therefore seems to have become effective
on December 1, 1995.17
The most significant change in the constitutional amendment provides
that a lien to refinance a lien against a homestead (including a federal tax
lien of both spouses or any tax debt of the owner) is valid. But it is not
anticipated that lending practices will be much changed as a result. Lend-
ing had been conducted in such flagrant disregard of existing law that
much, if not most, of the profession had come to think that such practice
was constitutionally allowed. Of further significance is the amendment
providing that "[a] purchaser or lender for value without actual knowl-
edge may conclusively rely on an affidavit that [dishonestly] designates
other property as the homestead of the affiant and that states that the
164. Or if the bankruptcy had ensued after B's successful appeal, the Fifth Circuit court
would have rejected A's appeal. Camp, 59 F.3d at 555 (citing Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d
497, 500 n.6 (Tex. 1982)).
165. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (amended 1995).
166. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996). Literally interpreted,
some of these provisions could be unconstitutionally applied with respect to events that
occurred during the brief period of their effectiveness, but they need not be so interpreted.
167. Id.
168. TEX. CONST. art., XVII, § 1 (amended 1972).
169. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 67.010(a), 67.012 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
170. Id. §§ 67.013(a), (d).
171. For an analysis of this point under prior constitutional and statutory provisions, see
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47
SMU L. REV. 1161, 1177-79 (1994).
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property to be conveyed or encumbered is not the homestead of the affi-
ant."'1 72 This is a considerable change in the law, and it puts aside con-
trary authorities such as Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock173 and
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Davenport174 when the homestead mortgagor's
misrepresentation is supported by an affidavit. The third objective of the
amendment was to dispose of banks' discomfort caused by the decision in
In re Buffington 175 in order to allow a lender to make a loan on an entire
homestead after its division between spouses on divorce. Another, but
minor, change substitutes a general statement for the repetition of the
types of debts allowed to burden a homestead with a lien rather than to
increase the catalogue with those types added by the amendment. 176
Although the generality of the language is sufficient to do so, there is no
evidence that the amendment was meant to dispose of homeowners' as-
sociations' liens for future improvements and maintenance charges al-
lowed in Inwood North Homeowners' Association v. Harris.177 That
decision has been explained as approving such liens for future mainte-
nance and improvements agreed to as covenants to run with the land
prior to the land's becoming a homestead. 178
Although cast in terms of an ex-wife appeal of the trial court's failure
to grant a temporary injunction against an ex-husband's efforts to fore-
close a lien against her homestead, her complaint in Magallanez v. Magal-
lanez179 actually amounted to an attack on the divorce court's division of
property, to which she had failed to object five years earlier. It is not
indicated in the appellate opinion whether the divorce decree was an
agreed order, but the court awarded the wife the community family
home, except for $14,000 of its value awarded to the husband as his share
of the community equity in the home. The husband's share was to be
paid to him when their son reached the age of eighteen. Although appar-
ently not directed by the court to do so, the wife had executed a note to
the husband for $14,000 and had given him a deed of trust lien on the
property that might be enforced when the son reached age eighteen.
When the son attained adulthood and the ex-wife was unable to pay the
172. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (amended 1995).
173. 76 Tex. 85, 13 S.W.2d 12 (1890) (When the spouses mortgaged their homestead,
the property described as their homestead was property they owned but on which they had
never lived.).
174. 323 S.W.2d 617-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ) (When they mort-
gaged their homestead, the spouses asserted that property belonging to someone else was
their homestead.) There is no appellate case dealing with a lender's reliance on the bor-
rowing spouses' imaginary property as their homestead when they gave a mortgage on
their actual homestead, but that situation is also covered by the amendment.
175. 167 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (commented on in Joseph W. MCKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REv. 1225, 1251-
52 (1995)).
176. However one may feel about the substance of the amendment, it is a superb exam-
ple of constitutional draftsmanship.
177. 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987).
178. Boudreaux Civic Ass'n v. Cox, 882 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, no writ).
179. 911 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
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lien, the ex-husband brought suit for foreclosure, which the ex-wife
sought to enjoin. The appellate court denied the ex-wife's appeal and
recognized what amounted to a vendor's lien on the homestead for pay-
ment of the husband's community interest in the property. 180
The dispute in Lawrence v. Lawrence'81 was rooted in an asserted error
in a property division on divorce. 182 But the husband had failed to appeal
and subsequent efforts to attack the decree were to no avail. Promptly
after being awarded a life estate in the husband's separate homestead
along with a money judgment, the ex-wife in possession abstracted her
judgment to perfect her judgment lien and to give notice of the passing of
title. Thereafter the ex-husband made a conveyance to his son of the
acreage subject to the ex-wife's life estate. The ex-wife then brought suit
against the son for a declaratory judgment to confirm her lien on the
property, presumably apprehensive that her lien would not attach be-
cause of her own homestead occupancy. The son defended her suit on
the ground that the lien did not reach his interest because he was the
successor of his father's homestead interest by conveyance. The appellate
court might have simply rejected this plea with the comment that a home-
stead right is not subject to transfer by mere conveyance. Rather, the
court undertook to explain that the ex-husband had no homestead estate
to convey because he had been stripped of his homestead interest as a
consequence of the decision in Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co.183
In Laster the ex-husband out of possession mortgaged his fee interest in
the former marital homestead. Because the appellate courts treated the
mortgage as valid, the grantor had presumably lost his homestead claim
as a result of acquiring another homestead or through abandonment,
though the appellate court did not specify the cause. There is certainly no
reason for the court's assertion in Lawrence that the Texas Supreme
Court in Laster treated the ex-husband's loss of his homestead as due to
ouster of possession by the divorce court or that the court meant to over-
rule earlier authority by which the owner (having established a home-
stead) is deemed to retain the homestead until abandonment is proved.184
The fundamental reason that the ex-wife's cause had to prevail was that a
homestead estate is simply not subject to transfer as such. It is a grantee's
establishing homestead occupancy-the fact of his claim-that estab-
180. Id. at 94 (citing McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984), and
Colquette v. Forbes, 680 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ)).
181. 911 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
182. See Lawrence v. Lawrence, 911 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
183. 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991) (discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1475, 1497-98 (1993)); see
also Svacina v. Gardner, 905 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
184. Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 119 S.W. 86 (1909); Posey v. Commer-
cial Nat'l Bank, 55 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved). The court
also garbled the conclusion of the court in Intertex, Inc. v. Kneisley, 837 S.W.2d 136, 138
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). A purchaser of a homestead does
not lose the protection of his predecessor's homestead claim as a result of the grantee's
failure to record promptly. But a failure to avoid a "gap" in homestead occupancy will
allow an already recorded lien to attach to the property. Id.
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lishes his homestead right. In Lawrence the son could not have acquired
a homestead claim because he had established no right by occupancy.'
85
A different reliance upon the authority of Laster (a voluntary transfer
case) prevailed in Patterson v. First National Bank of Lake Jackson186 (an
acquisition by foreclosure case). There, the husband and wife were di-
vorced in 1981, and the wife was awarded occupancy of the community
home with their minor children. Her right of occupancy, however, was to
terminate on her remarriage when the house would be sold and the pro-
ceeds divided between the ex-spouses. She remarried in 1982. At that
point the ex-husband might have asserted his right to reoccupy the prem-
ises but he failed to do so. The ex-wife was divorced in 1983 and remar-
ried in 1988, while continuing to maintain her residence in the house. In
1986 the ex-husband borrowed money from a bank. When he defaulted
on the loan, the bank took a judgment against him and abstracted its
judgment. Subsequently the bank levied execution on the property and
bought the ex-husband's interest at the sheriffs sale. In 1993 the bank
brought a partition suit, which the ex-wife opposed. It does not appear
that the ex-husband intervened to assert the invalidity of the levy or the
sheriff's sale, but the appellate court stated that he had offered an affida-
vit which showed that he had not claimed any other homestead and that
he intended that his children stay in the house. 187 Both the ex-wife and
the bank moved for summary judgment and the bank's motion was
granted. On appeal the court reversed the trial court's ruling on the ap-
parent ground that assertion of the ex-husband's rights precluded relief
for the bank. Laster was understood as holding that an ex-spouse's future
right of possession might be cut off by the grantee of his interest on which
his homestead right depended but not by his judgment creditor. In Pat-
terson, however, there was ample evidence that the ex-husband had not
abandoned his homestead right under Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes,'
ss
whereas in Laster he may have actually abandoned his homestead right or
was assumed to have done so by his voluntary conveyance.
In State v. 1204 North 12th Street,'89 the state had asserted a right to
seize a couple's homestead under the Contraband Forfeiture Act' 90 but
on appeal merely sought to seize the right of the guilty spouse and was
allowed to recover. There was no assertion that the house was a home-
stead. If homestead protection had been asserted, the position of the
state sovereign is fundamentally different from that of the national sover-
eign whose power as against rights under state law have the authority of
185. A harder case would be that of an unmarried son who had lived on the premises
and asserts a derivative claim from his father who maintains a homestead right in the re-
mainder and purports to transfer his fee interest to the son along with the homestead right
based on the son's prior occupancy.
186. 921 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
187. Id. at 246.
188. 102 Tex. 451, 119 S.W. 86, 88 (1909).
189. 907 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, n.w.h.).
190. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 59.01-.11 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
103919961
SMU LAW REVIEW
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution1 91 to support it.
The state of Texas, however, is subject to the homestead provisions of the
Texas Constitution' 92 unless relieved from their strictures by some other
provision of the fundamental law.
In Auclair v. Sher'93 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinc-
tion between the federal government's power to reach homestead prop-
erty to collect a fine 194 and the lack of power of a victim of a federal
crime 195 to enforce a restitution award against similar property. Federal
law does not give the victim greater power than any other person would
have to enforce a civil judgment. 196
F. EXEMPT PERSONALTY
In In re Henry197 a Chapter 7 bankrupt debtor moved for removal of a
non-purchase-money lien from a piece of welding equipment as a tool of
trade.' 98 The lien creditor asserted that the equipment was not a tool of
trade because the debtor was a full-time salaried employee and used the
equipment only in part-time work. Using "a common sense interpreta-
tion on a case-by-case basis,"'199 the Bankruptcy Court held that the
equipment used in a part-time business was an exempt tool of trade and
avoided the lien.
The court held in In re Standel200 that the assets of a deferred compen-
sation plan were exempt either as a "plan or program of annuities and
benefits in use by any employer" under article 21.22 of the Insurance
Code 201 or as "current wages" under Property Code section 42.001.202
The assets were not exempt under Property Code section 42.0021, how-
ever, because the plan was not a "'qualified pension, profit sharing or
stock plan' under the Internal Revenue Code. '20 3
G. TURNOVER PROCEEDING
A turnover proceeding is a device designed to give a creditor a means
of reaching a debtor's non-exempt assets that are not accessible by other
means of forced seizure. 2°4 The debtor is protected by an exemption of
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 2.
192. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
193. 63 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1995).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h)(1) (1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3613 (1995).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h)(2) (1995).
196. Auclair, 63 F.3d at 409.
197. 183 B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1995), in which the debtor claimed federal
exemptions.
198. Id. at 749; 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) (1995).
199. In re Walkington, 42 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (cited in Henry, 183
B.R. at 750).
200. 185 B.R. 227 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
201. Id. at 231-33, 235; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.22, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
202. Id. at 234-35; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
203. Id. at 233, 235; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
204. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1996).
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"the proceeds of current wages"'205 and circumstances that show an abuse
of discretion by the court's imposing the order to turnover assets.206 In
DeVore v. Central Bank & Trust Co. 207 the debtor asserted error in the
court's judgment in both respects. The debtor, an attorney who was paid
almost $11,000 monthly by a corporation he had represented for many
years, had been ordered to pay $2,000 monthly from this amount to dis-
charge a judgment debt. The majority of the court found, as had the trial
court apparently, that the debtor was not an employee of the corporation
but an independent contractor and that his earnings therefore did not
constitute "current wages" in a master-servant context208 and were there-
fore not protected from seizure. The appellate court also rejected the
debtor's contention that the trial court abused its discretion.
20 9
In Ex parte Prado210 the court applied a stricter standard in favor of
the debtor, a self-employed ticket scalper. After a long discussion as to
whether the debtor's earnings were more akin to an employee's wages or
an attorney's accounts receivable the court said that such a distinction, if
any, was not controlling. 21' In granting the debtor's release by a writ of
habeas corpus, the court concluded that the trial court's order forced the
debtor "to choose between work and jail... [and] that the imposition of
such a choice is beyond the power of the statute. '21 2 In saying that the
debtor "had no existing nonexempt property or the future rights to any
such nonexempt property .... -213 the court clearly concluded that the
debtor's earnings were "current wages" because there was no other type
of exempt property that described them. The court's explanation was
merely that the court's commitment of the debtor to jail for failure to




1. Personal Jurisdiction. In Dawson-Austin v. Austin215 on a motion
for rehearing, the court commented on a number of procedural points in
205. Caulley v. Caulley, 806 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex. 1991) (citing the 1989 amendment to
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(f) (Vernon 1986)); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 42.001(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
206. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991).
207. 908 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.).
208. 908 S.W.2d at 610. The term "current wages" implies a master and servant rela-
tionship, not an attorney engaged in private practice as an independent contractor. Brink
v. Ayre, 855 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
209. Id. at 607-09. The dissenting judge disagreed on the facts and on the failure of the
creditor to show that other means of recovery had failed.
210. 911 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, n.w.h.).
211. Id. at 850.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18).




relation to personal jurisdiction over the wife who was not a domiciliary
of Texas. These included her waiver of a special appearance and its con-
sequences216 and her lack of specificity in making a conditional motion to
quash service of citation,217 as well as her plea in abatement. 218
2. Venue.219 In Atkinson v. Arnold220 the court held that in the ab-
sence of a showing of peculiar circumstances, a temporary injunction
(rather than a plea in abatement) is an inappropriate remedy to lay the
venue of a suit in another county and thus protect the jurisdiction of the
court in which a dispute has proceeded. 221 The matter in dispute was the
breach of a property settlement agreement reached in a prior divorce
proceeding. In Newton v. Newton222 the plaintiff sued for damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Venue was laid in the county
in which the damages had been allegedly inflicted rather than the county
where the divorce had been granted. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals
held that the laying of venue was proper 223 and that in the venue contest,
the plaintiff is not required to defeat affirmative defenses, such as the
statute of limitation.224 Under the circumstances, however, the court
found that under "the continuing course of conduct" doctrine, the statute
of limitation did not begin to run until the wrongful conduct ceased.225
3. Citation. After filing his petition for divorce in Spivey v. Hollo-
way,226 the husband procured the wife's waiver of service of citation, but
it was defective in that it lacked the wife's address. The husband never-
theless proceeded to trial in the wife's absence and the divorce was
granted. Before the court signed the decree, however, the husband filed
a corrected waiver of citation that included the wife's address, and the
decree was approved and signed by both parties. The wife appealed on
the grounds that she had not made a proper waiver of service and that the
216. Id. at 781-83.
217. Id. at 784-85.
218. Id. at 785-86. This point made in the court's vacated opinion, Dawson-Austin v.
Austin, 1995 WL 1680 *1, *6-9 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Jan. 3, 1995, n.w.h.), was noted in Jo-
seph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU
L. REv. 1225, 1260 (1995), and is substantially unchanged. The court also commented on
the requirement of verification of discovery responses under TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(5), id. at
792, and a showing of good cause to overcome failure to supplement a discovery response
concerning an expert witness under TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(5), id. at 794. See notes 380-81
infra and accompanying text.
219. Though the appellate decisions here discussed do not consider the problem of ju-
risdiction to grant a divorce, the court in Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.), commented briefly on personal jurisdiction in the clarifica-
tion and enforcement phases of divorce practice.
220. 893 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
221. Id. at 298.
222. 895 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.).
223. Id. at 505-06 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.063(1) (Vernon
1986) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 87)).
224. Id. at 506 (citing Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, 131 S.W.2d 742, 744
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, no writ) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(2)(b)).
225. Id (citing "l\vyman v. lXvyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990),
rev'd on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993)).
226. 902 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
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corrected waiver signed after the hearing could not cure the court's error
retrospectively. The Houston First District Court of Appeals rejected
this argument in that the defective waiver of service did not constitute
error on the face of the record because the address-requirement 227 is not
mandatory in consent-judgment cases. 228 The appellate court went on to
hold that the wife's signing of the divorce decree constituted a general
appearance. 229 Standing alone, that point could have sufficed to sustain
the court's position. The court might have buttressed its other ground by
relying on Rule 118230 that allows amendment of any proof of service at
the court's discretion "unless it clearly appears that 'material prejudice'
would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the pro-
cess issued."'231
4. Answer. Sabanos v. Rivera232 raised the recurring question whether
a letter to the court may constitute an answer so that the respondent is
entitled to notice of a trial setting under rule 245.233 In this instance the
husband who had been sued for divorce wrote the court that he was "un-
able financially" to hire counsel but that he had an appointment for
assistance with a legal aid society about six weeks later. Attached to the
letter was a signed waiver of citation and entry of an appearance in which
he authorized the court to consider the cause without further notice to
him. After the court gave judgment noting that the husband "wholly
made default,"234 the husband appealed by writ of error to assert that his
letter constituted an answer. The appellate court interpreted the words
of the judgment to mean that the husband had filed no answer. Thus,
because the document in the record constituted an answer, error was ap-
parent on the face of the record in order to meet the requirement for
reversal by writ of error.235 The court said that its other alternative was
to presume that the trial court had considered the husband's letter as an
answer but nonetheless had granted a post-answer default judgment be-
cause the formal waiver of citation allowed the court to proceed without
notice. This alternative was rejected because it presumed the invalidity of
the default judgment, "a presumption prohibited by the applicable stan-
dard of review. '236
The wife's appeal in Miller v. Miller237 rested on the court's overruling
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 119.
228. Spivey, 902 S.W.2d at 48 (distinguishing Travieso v. Travieso, 649 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ), as a default judgment case).
229. TEX. R. Civ. P. 124.
230. TEX. R. Civ. P. 118.
231. Id.; see Carroll G. Robinson, Keeping Up with Civil Procedure, 33 Hous. LAW. 12
(Nov.-Dec. 1995).
232. No. 01-94-01269-CV, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2298 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
233. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
234. Sabanos, 1995 LEXIS 2298, at *2.
235. Id. at *3 (citing Hughes v. Habitat Apartments, 860 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. 1993);
Smith v. Lippman, 826 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. 1992)).
236. Id. at *4.
237. 903 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, n.w.h.).
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her motion for a new trial. The wife's attorney had originally filed a peti-
tion for divorce on her behalf in county A, but the court there abated the
proceeding on the ground that she had not been a resident of that county
for ninety days as of the filing date.2 38 Her husband then filed for divorce
in county B, and after the wife was served with citation, her attorney
asked the husband's attorney for a continuance of the temporary hearing
because the wife's attorney was ill. Both parties apparently agreed to the
continuance, and the trial judge passed the case. Without filing an answer
the wife's attorney then informed her that he could not represent her
because of his illness. The wife then employed another lawyer who ad-
vised her that he could not attend to her case for at least two weeks be-
cause of other commitments. The husband and his attorney then sought
judgment which was granted in light of the wife's failure to answer.
When the wife heard that judgment had been entered, she notified her
counsel and he filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of the wife's
lack of knowledge of the status of her case, rather than conscious indiffer-
ence on her part. Neither the wife nor her attorney was aware that her
prior counsel had failed to file an answer. The court nevertheless over-
ruled her motion. The appellate court followed the prevailing tendency
to grant a new trial with liberality239 in that the wife's failure to appear
was not intentional, that she had a meritorious defense to the husband's
plea for custody of the children and division of property, and that she had
offered to reimburse her husband for any cost that he had incurred in
obtaining the judgment.2 40 Most particularly, the court concluded that
under the circumstances a reasonable layman in the wife's position would
not have realized that an answer had not been filed on her behalf.241
The sequence of events was somewhat different in Bennett v. Ben-
nett.242 There, after the respondent had failed to file an answer, the peti-
tion for divorce was granted. Before the written decree was entered,
however, the respondent entered her answer, though it did not contain a
certificate of service. The filing of the answer, though defective, there-
fore prevented proper entry of a written decree, and the respondent was
entitled to a new trial.243
5. Notice of Trial. In Marr v. Mart244 the consequences of the wife's,
or her attorney's, inattention to the petitioning husband's discovery re-
quest was saved by her prior filing of a request for a jury trial. After the
wife had filed her answer to her husband's petition for divorce, the wife
was ordered to produce certain documents. Over seven months after her
238. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1993).
239. Miller, S.W.2d at 47 (citing Iley v. Reynolds, 319 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
240. Id. at 47-48 (citing Craddock v. Sunset Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124
(1939)).
241. Id. at 47.
242. 868 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
243. Id. at 409 (citing Reitmeyer v. Charm Craft Publisher, 619 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1981, no writ)).
244. 905 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, n.w.h.).
1044 [Vol. 49
HUSBAND AND WIFE
failure to produce the documents, the husband filed a motion to compel
the production of the documents and for contempt and sanctions for fail-
ure to do so. Almost a year after the initial order to produce, at a hearing
the court reset the trial and ordered that if the requested documents were
not produced within three weeks, the wife's pleading would be struck.
On the day following the unmet deadline for production and just after the
court had advised the wife's attorney's partner by telephone that the trial
would proceed, the court struck the wife's pleadings and then heard and
granted the husband's petition in the wife's absence. A decree was en-
tered three days later.
Rule 243245 provides that a defendant who has requested a jury trial be
provided a hearing before a jury even though an argument on the merits
of the case has been forfeited. On appeal, the majority of the Waco
court held that the rule applies to divorce cases because the jury's func-
tion in the characterization and valuation of marital property in divorce
cases is analogous to the fixing of unliquidated damages specifically re-
ferred to by the rule.2 46 A concurring judge disagreed as to the applica-
bility of Rule 243, however, because a matter of unliquidated damages
was not in dispute, rather (he asserted) the dispute entailed fact questions
of a decidedly different nature. 247 Extending the logic of the majority's
position, he said, would require Rule 243 to be applied "any time the
court has to decide a fact question before it can enter a final judgment
following a default .... -248 The concurring judge went on to say that
striking the wife's pleadings did not constitute a failure to answer so that
a default judgment might have been entered against her.249 That is, be-
cause a true default judgment cannot be entered in a divorce case,250
Rule 215251 (allowing the striking of pleadings as a sanction) cannot
amount to a default. Although the trial court could strike the wife's
pleadings as a sanction against her, "it could not enter a default judgment
against her without giving her notice of the hearing at which the court
would hear allegations in her husband's petition. 2 52 On the effects of
her demand for a jury trial the concurring judge made the further point
that the wife was entitled to a jury trial on any fact question related either
to the divorce or to the division of property. "The court did not strike her
jury demand when it struck her pleadings. '253 On both points the con-
245. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243.
246. Marr, 905 S.W.2d at 334. The brief time allowed for preparation for trial after
notice was sufficient under Rule 243.
247. Id. at 335.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.53 (Vernon 1993); Mason v. Mason, 282 S.W.2d 320
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, no writ).
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.
252. Marr, 905 S.W.2d at 335.
253. Id. (citing Global Serv., Inc. v. Bianchi, 901 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1995) (quoting
TransAmerican Natural Gas v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991). The imposition of
any sanction in connection with compliance with a discovery request must "be no more
severe than [is] necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose.")).
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curring judge's arguments are persuasive.
After the wife had answered her husband's petition for divorce in Mis-
ium v. Misium 254 and her counsel had received notice of a trial setting,
her attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that there was
no setting for the trial. The court granted the motion and a copy of the
order was sent to the husband's attorney. The husband's attorney never-
theless proceeded to trial on the original trial setting and a divorce was
granted in the absence of the wife. After the court had overruled the
wife's motion for a new trial, the wife appealed on the ground that the
court had erred in rendering judgment because she had no notice of the
trial setting. The wife's attorney had stated in his motion to withdraw
that there was no trial setting and the motion was approved by the trial
court. The wife, therefore, could rely on the lack of a trial setting, and
she was entitled to a new trial because the case had gone to trial without
her receiving notice.255
In Rolon v. Rolon256 the divorce proceeding had been commenced by
the wife, the husband had filed an answer and counterclaim, and tempo-
rary orders had been entered. A trial date was set, but the husband's
attorney was sick in the hospital and was not notified of the trial setting
until a day or two before trial. When told by the court that he could
either proceed or withdraw, the attorney chose to withdraw and the hus-
band proceeded to trial without counsel. After a judgment was entered
in favor of the wife, the husband procured new counsel, but the court
denied his motion for a new trial. On the husband's appeal the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals held that the trial court had committed error even
though the husband's attorney had received notice of the trial in accord-
ance with the rules.2 57
6. Temporary Orders. In Ex parte Chunn258 the husband had been or-
dered to make monthly mortgage payments on the family home as an
element of support payments. In May, the wife moved the court to find
the husband in contempt of the court's order for failure to make pay-
ments for March, April, and May and added that she believed that her
husband would fail to make payments for June, July, and August. At a
hearing held in late June the court found the husband in contempt for
failure to make payments for March through June. The husband sought
release by writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his right to due
process had been violated because he had been found guilty of an offense
that occurred after the motion for contempt was filed. The court
agreed. 259 Because the finding of non-payment in June was void, the
254. 902 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied).
255. Id. at 197.
256. 907 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, n.w.h.).
257. Id. at 671.
258. No. 01-95-00803-CV, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.],
Nov. 2, 1995, n.w.h.).




court held that the entire order was void and the relator was entitled to
be released.
Ex parte Kimsey260 concerned a husband who sought release from com-
mitment for civil contempt resulting from his failure to pay attorney's
fees. He argued that the attorney's fees were merely debts owed by his
wife to her attorney and that his commitment therefore constituted im-
prisonment for debt contrary to the Texas Constitution.261 The court de-
nied his application for release, once again reiterating the distinction
between support obligations (which include the payment of attorney's
fees in a divorce proceeding) and debt obligations to other persons.262
Whether a husband is ordered to pay his wife temporary alimony, which
includes her attorney's fees, or to pay an amount into the registry of the
court for his wife's attorney's fees is of no consequence in this context.
"In each instance, the wife is recouping the benefit of the support
award." 263
7. Name Change. In 1995 the legislature amended the correlative pro-
vision concerning the name change of a party to a divorce, annulment, or
a suit to declare a marriage void 264 in sections 3.64(a) and 32.24(a) of the
Family Code.265 The amendment provides that "the court shall change
the name of a party specifically requesting the change to a prior used
name unless the court states in the decree a reason for denying the
change .... ",266 The change of name is virtually available on request of
the court, provided a name previously used is desired. If a name other
than one previously used is sought, the petitioner may rely on name
change by reputation. It is also worthy of note that the person wishing
the change must make the request personally. A request made by the
other party will not suffice. If an ex-parte divorce is sought and the re-
spondent wishes a change of name, the petitioner's request for the name
change of the other spouse should be supported by the respondent's
sworn request for name change with a statement of the reason for the
change.
8. Expert Witness. In an en banc rehearing of Collins v. Collins2 6 7 the
Houston First District Court of Appeals (with two judges dissenting) con-
cluded that the husband (as well as his closest business associate who was
not a party to the proceeding) should not have testified to the value of
260. 915 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1995).
261. TEX. CONST. art I, § 18.
262. Kimsey, 915 S.W.2d at 525 (citing Ex parte Hall 854 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1993)).
263. Id. at 526.
264. The reference to a suit to declare a marriage void was added to § 3.64 in 1995.
Although the second sentence of § 3.64 was repealed in 1995, the amendment does not
affect the prior statement there that a change of name does not affect prior liability or the
right of the party whose name is changed. The statement was deleted merely because it
was deemed superfluous.
265. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §8 3.64(a), 32.4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
266. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.64(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996). Thus the petitioner will
have a ground for appeal readily available.




two corporations (half-owned by the community estate) because they
were not designated as expert-witnesses and the substance of their testi-
mony was not produced before trial.268 The trial court had allowed the
expert-testimony over the wife's objection. In response to the wife's in-
terrogatories the husband and his associate had not been listed as expert-
witnesses. Hence, the court could allow their testimony only on proof of
"good cause," which was not shown by the husband. 269 The dissenting
judges regarded the testimony as that of lay witnesses as to value rather
than expert-testimony. 270 Neither the court nor the dissenting judges of-
fered any guidance for dealing with this sort of definitional impasse un-
less one assumes, as the court seemed to assume, that seemingly harmful
evidence as to valuation of a significant asset offered by a witness was
expert evidence. 271 One ground for disagreement between the judges was
the fact that the husband and his associate testified prior to trial that they
would give no testimony as to value, and the husband's counsel assured
the wife's lawyer that the husband would not testify about value unless he
changed his mind, in which case the wife's counsel would be informed in
advance.272 Those assurances apparently were not honored.
9. Death of a Spouse. As between the spouses, death of one of them
before rendition abates a suit for divorce and any issue of custody be-
tween them.273 In Nichols v. Nichols,2 74 however, the husband died on
the evening of the day an agreed judgment for divorce was entered, and
the wife sought a new trial. During five years prior to the wife's filing for
divorce the husband had suffered dn acute debilitating disease that had
exhausted much of the couple's assets, and they had decided that a di-
vorce was the best means of protecting the wife's financial interests. On
the grounds of the extreme emotional and physical stress under which she
suffered and her lack of understanding of the agreed order and its effects,
the wife moved that the order be set aside and a new trial be granted.
Within thirty days of rendering the decree the court granted her motion.
The husband's children, who had not received notice of the wife's motion,
moved to reinstate the decree, and on the court's refusal they appealed.
The Tyler Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's exercise of discre-
tion to grant a new trial275 and concluded that the court was not unrea-
sonable in doing so in light of the severe stress under which the wife
suffered at the time the decree was entered. The court agreed with the
children's position that they were entitled to notice of the motion for a
268. Id. at 799 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(1), Exxon Corp. v. West Texas Gather-
ing Co., 868 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tex. 1993), Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 914
(Tex. 1992), and Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986)).
269. Id. at 802.
270. Id. at 806.
271. Id.
272. Collins, 904 S.W.2d at 800.
273. Smelscer v. Smelscer, 901 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
274. 907 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-yler 1995, n.w.h.).




new trial, but the court concluded that under the circumstances they were
not harmed by the action taken.276
10. Appeal. A timely appeal from the report of a family court master
(or associate judge) is entitled to a hearing de novo before the referring
court. 277 If the referring court should inadvertently sign an order adopt-
ing the master's report, however, an appeal should be taken to the court
of appeals. If the appellant to the referring court fails to take his appeal
within the time allowed, the order will be no longer appealable and he
must attack it by a bill of review. 278 State ex rel. Latty v. OwenS 279 con-
cerned an appeal from the subsequent order of the referring court finally
entered after a trial de novo. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
second order of the referring court (that was entered after a trial de
novo) was void because the first order was left standing without appellate
challenge.2 80
The timeliness of a hearing on a contest of ability to pay costs of an
appeal by writ of error was in issue in Sabanos v. Rivera.281 The Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that the trial court must rule on such
a contest or sign an order within ten days after the contest is filed and the
court may not extend the time for more than twenty days after an order
of extension 282 or the appellant's allegations must be taken as true.283
The trial court's failure to act within the time allowed therefore defeated
the contest.
A panel of the Houston First District Court of Appeals in Rafferty v.
Finstad284 divided on the rankling question of the duty of a trial court to
make findings of fact and conclusions regarding valuations and character-
izations of marital assets to be divided on divorce. Although the majority
of the court deemed such findings and conclusions as not "ultimate and
controlling issues" within TEx. R. Civ. P. 298,285 Justice O'Connor, dis-
senting, cogently pointed out that "[w]ithout information about the trial
court's underlying assumptions about the character of the property, reim-
bursement to the community, and value of the property, we have no way
276. Id. at 11; TEX. R. Civ. P. 152.
277. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.012 (Vernon 1988).
278. TEX. R. App. P. 52.
279. 907 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (reversing State ex rel. Latty v. Owens,
893 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995)).
280. Id. at 486.
281. 893 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.) (per curiam).
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 40(a)(3)(E).
283. Sabanos, 893 S.W.2d at 275-76.
284. 903 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
285. Id. at 376 (citing inter alia Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ), and Wallace v. Wallace, 623 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd)). Only the "just and right" division of community
property under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1993) is the ultimate and controlling
issue. Id. Both Finch and Wallace were severely criticized by William Dudley, Preserva-
tion of Error and Appellate Practice, 1994 ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSES NN-1 at NN-
24 (State Bar of Texas 1994).
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to decide if the trial court's ultimate division is 'just and right'. '286 Justice
O'Connor's conclusion is hard to fault.2
87
11. Alternative Dispute Resolution. In 1995 the legislature required a
petitioner for divorce and a respondent to state a willingness to submit to
other methods of dispute resolution (including mediation) rather than lit-
igation to settle the issues in contest.288 When reduced to writing, the
mediated settlement is enforceable "in the same manner as any other
written contract" 289 and may be incorporated in the court's decree. 29°
B. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Two cases involved property settlement agreements repudiated by one
of the parties to a divorce. In Sohocki v. Sohockit 91 a settlement agree-
ment was read into the record after a trial on the merits before a special
master. Three weeks later and before the district court adopted the
master's recommendation and signed the decree, the wife filed a revoca-
tion of the agreement. In response to the wife's appeal the husband
sought to sustain the judgment by asserting that the wife was required to
present direct testimony of her revocation. The appeals court rejected his
argument and held that the decree was void for want of consent. 292 Cary
v. Cary293 was a harder case. After a court-ordered mediation proceed-
ing the couple reached a Rule 11294 agreement that was signed by both
parties. By the time the court convened to render a consent decree about
three weeks later, the wife had repudiated the agreement. The court,
nevertheless, ruled that the agreement was valid under chapter 154 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code 295 and rendered the divorce accord-
ingly. The Houston First District Court sustained the wife's appeal and
rejected the conclusion of the Amarillo Court of Appeals in In re
Ames.296 The Houston Court relied on the provision of Family Code sec-
tion 3.631(a) 297 that the agreement may be repudiated. That section pro-
vides that the agreement may be repudiated prior to rendition "unless it
is binding under some other rule of law."'298 This provision, the court
286. Rafferty, 903 S.W.2d at 380 (citing Joseph v. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)).
287. There is an intimation to the same effect in Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d 539
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
288. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.522 (Vernon Supp. 1996). One wonders whether the
requirement was meant to be jurisdictional.
289. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
290. Id. See generally Harper Estes, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Made in
Mediation, 58 TEX. B.J. 338 (1995).
291. 897 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, n.w.h.).
292. Id. at 424.
293. 894 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
294. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11 (agreed judgment).
295. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (alterna-
tive dispute resolution).
296. 860 S.W.2d 590, 592 n.1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ); see also Davis v.
Wickham, 917 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.).




held, does not encompass a mediation under the Civil Practice and Rem-
edies Code.299 To so conclude, the court said, "would transform media-
tion into binding arbitration. '30 0 The court went on to say that the
husband may nevertheless pursue an action for breach of the contract
arising from the mediation for which he may be awarded "damages and
specific performance, where applicable," which he may plead in his di-
vorce case so that all matters are tried together.301 The provisions of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 154.071,302 as enacted in 1995
does not address the consequences of a repudiated settlement agreement.
On a previous appeal of the same dispute before the court in Parker v.
Parker303 the court had concluded that a binding contract had not been
reached, 3°4 but on remand the trial court awarded damages for breach of
that contract. The appellate court held that the trial court had erred.30 5
C. DIVIsION ON DIVORCE
Although a panel of the Dallas Court of Appeals in Dawson-Austin v.
Austin306 described the principal point at issue before it as one of "char-
acterization" of matrimonial property, the issue is more accurately de-
scribed as property "classification" under section 3.63(b)307 of the Family
Code (for the purpose of property division on divorce) when the property
was acquired before the parties became subject to Texas law. Prior to
marriage the husband had inherited a substantial interest in a Minnesota
corporation and the couple were domiciled in Minnesota for many years
of their marriage. After their separation the husband moved to Texas
and brought suit for divorce against his wife who was living in California.
The shares of the corporation had greatly appreciated in value during the
marriage, and the wife argued that their appreciation in value should be
divided on divorce as it would have been if the divorce proceedings had
been brought in Minnesota. In an early stage of the trial, however, the
trial court had granted a partial summary judgment for the husband by
which the securities (as appreciated in value) were adjudged to be his
separate property under Texas law and, thus, were not subject to division.
At the end of the trial the court divided the far less significant (but still
very considerable) community estate between the parties.
On the wife's appeal, it was agreed that the inherited corporate shares
were indeed the husband's separate property when acquired, but the par-
ties continued to disagree as to the proper classification of the apprecia-
299. Cary, 894 S.W.2d at 112.
300. Id. at 113.
301. Id.
302. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
303. 897 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
304. Parker v. Parker, No. 2-88-170-CV (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Nov. 22, 1989, writ
denied) (not designated for publication).
305. Parker, 897 S.W.2d at 924.
306. 920 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, n.w.h.).
307. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon 1993).
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tion of the shares for the purpose of division. The wife sought application
of Minnesota law, and the husband argued that the law of Texas should
apply. First, the husband argued that because section 3.63(b) provides
that property acquired during marriage that would have been community
property if it had been acquired by Texas domiciliaries is divided as com-
munity property in a Texas divorce, all other property is separate prop-
erty for that purpose. The appellate court rejected the sweeping
conclusion that section 3.63(b) constitutes "a comprehensive choice-of-
law provision" 308 but concluded that the different rules of Texas and Min-
nesota law for the divisibility of the increase in value of the separate
shares needed to be addressed in a choice-of-law context. The court
looked to the most significant contacts principle propounded in Duncan
v. Cessna Aircraft Co.309 as a general choice-of-law rule. Applying the
rule in Duncan310 the court concluded that Texas is the state with the
most significant relationship to the action, and thus Texas law rather than
Minnesota law should apply in classifying the increase in value of the
property, which both states treat as separate property.31'
D. MAKING THE DIVISION
The husband complained of the divorce court's division of property on
a number of grounds in Siefkas v. Siefkas.312 The court had ordered that
the husband discharge a second mortgage contracted by both spouses for
the improvement of the family home of which the wife was given posses-
sion and ordered to pay the first mortgage on the property. The husband
asserted that his being ordered to pay the second mortgage constituted an
invalid award of alimony to the wife.313 The appellate court rejected this
argument because the husband was not ordered to make periodic post-
divorce monetary payments to his ex-wife but was merely ordered to dis-
charge a debt that he already owed. Ordering him to make the payment,
the court said, was commensurate to an award of a money judgment to
the wife to balance the equities as between the parties in making a divi-
sion of property. 314
The husband also objected to the divorce court's giving the wife posses-
sion of certain community personalty (awarded to him) until he paid the
second mortgage against the home. The appellate court also approved
308. Dawson-Austin, 920 S.W.2d at 789.
309. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). See also Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc.,
817 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1991).
310. Dawson-Austin, 920 S.W.2d at 789-91.
311. It is in that respect that the decision was most radically changed on rehearing. In is
earlier opinion the court had observed that "application of Minnesota law in this case does
not impair the husband's rights because he 'loses no more that he loses in a judgment
rendered' in Minnesota." Dawson-Austin, 1995 WL 1680 at *12 (quoting Cameron, 641
S.W.2d 210, 222-23 (Tex. 1982)).
312. 902 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
313. Id. at 75.
314. Id. (citing Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-




what it termed a sort of possessory lien against the personalty that consti-
tuted "a reasonable and properly focused incentive for [him] to [dis-
charge] the lien as ordered . : . and requires no threat of cumbersome
efforts to seek court enforcement to be effective." 315 The court also
noted that the divorce court had similarly awarded the husband posses-
sion of personalty awarded to the wife and he was allowed to hold it until
his property was returned to him.316
The husband in Siefkas also complained that certain personalty was
awarded to his wife that was shown to be either his separate property or
property of his separately owned corporation. Although the corporation
was not a party to the proceeding and the evidence in the record was
murky, the appellate court remanded the case for a redivision of the as-
sets317 but "without conducting a new evidentiary hearing or taking any
new evidence whatsoever. '318
In this319 and other appellate challenges to divisions of property for
abuse of discretion320 the court found no abuses by the trial court.
E. EX-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
After over thirty years of evasive, desolatory consideration of the mat-
ter,32' the Legislature at its 1995 session enacted a bill to provide for judi-
cially ordered maintenance of a former spouse.322 This post-divorce
maintenance provision is applicable to all suits for divorce filed from Sep-
tember 1, 1995.323 A spouse is eligible for such a maintenance award (1)
if the marriage has existed for ten years and the spouse will have insuffi-
cient property to provide for minimal needs or (2) if the other spouse was
convicted (or received a deferred adjudication and was placed under
community supervision) for an act of family violence.324 The recipient
ex-spouse's inability to provide for minimal needs can be the result of
315. Id. at 76.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 80 (citing Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985); McKnight v.
McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976)).
318. Id. (citing LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 761 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, writ denied); Barker v. Barker, 688 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi,
1984, no writ)).
319. Id. at 74.
320. See Forgason v. Forgason, 911 S.W.2d 893,896 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, n.w.h.);
Abernathy v. Fehlis, 911 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, n.w.h.); In re Moore, 890
S.W.2d 821, 838-39, 841-43 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, n.w.h.). In Dawson-Austin, 920
S.W.2d at 795, the court rejected an assertion of abuse of discretion seemingly based on the
trial court's failure to note disparity of earning power.
321. See James W. Paulsen, Remember the Alimo[ny]! The Unique Texas Bar on Perma-
nent Alimony and the Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (1993).
322. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.9601-3.9611 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (passed as a part of
the 1995 Welfare Reform Act).
323. If a petitioner for divorce took a non-suit of a petition between January 1, 1995
and August 31, 1995, the alimony act is inapplicable to any further suit for divorce filed by
that person before January 1, 1997 [Act of Sept., 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 655, Sec.
1003(a)], codified as TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.9601 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
324. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.9602 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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physical or mental incapacity, the care of a child who requires supervision
because of physical or mental disability, or a lack of earning ability. 325
Thus, apart from the length of the marriage, eligibility is based on need or
fault. But such need or fault may be factually unrelated to the marital
relationship.
The amount of monthly maintenance awarded, however, cannot exceed
the lesser of $2,500 or twenty percent of the obligor's average monthly
gross income 326 and cannot extend for a period beyond three years.327
The recipient ex-spouse is therefore put under some pressure to become
self-sufficient but, because of the length of time allowed, may be unwill-
ing or unable to do so. The state could thereby be temporarily relieved of
some of the responsibility to care for such an ex-spouse (for reasons
which in some instances may not relate to the obligor's act or omissions
toward the recipient) but not permanently.
If there are sound reasons for bringing a marriage to an end by divorce
and thus rendering each former spouse a single person, there is no sound
reason for requiring one of them to compensate the other except for a
marriage-related cause. Elsewhere post-divorce awards have been given
for maintenance by a misplaced analogy to maintenance awards made to
a separated spouse who was still married. Awards of post-divorce main-
tenance initially resulted from an unwillingness of legislatures and courts
either (1) to divide a husband's property by accelerating the wife's vested
rights of dower and its statutory substitutes or (2) to grant damages for
marital wrongs that justified a divorce. If we must make such awards, we
should identify them for what they are and provide for monetary awards
with some care. The 1995 maintenance act is a legislative effort at solving
a problem but is not an appropriate solution-a careless response to pres-
sures of over thirty years to conform to an irrational concept prevailing
elsewhere. There are certainly instances when the wrongs suffered by
one spouse cannot be compensated because of a lack of community prop-
erty to divide or possibly by the nature of the wrong inflicted. But the
relief fashioned by the legislature is seriously flawed.
An order to pay maintenance under the act is a personal obligation of
the obligor and terminates on the obligor's death328 as it would in the
case of a penalty against the obligor. Even if the needs of the recipient
are the consequences of a wrong or a condition of marriage unreasonably
imposed on the recipient by the obligor, the recipient forfeits the provi-
sion's for maintenance if the recipient remarries or cohabits with another
person on a "continuing conjugal basis. '329 Thus, the award may not fully
compensate for the wrong suffered. On the other hand, if the award is
not based on a wrong perpetrated by the obligor, the imposition of main-
325. Id.
326. Id. § 3.9606(a).
327. Id. § 3.9605(a)(1).
328. Id. § 3.9607(a).
329. Id. A material change in circumstances will allow downward modification of the
maintenance award but not its increase. TEX. FAM. CODE Arm. § 3.9608(a).
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tenance puts an unwarranted burden on the obligor-an order to pay a
sort of private welfare benefit to the recipient.
The divorce court is directed to limit the duration of the maintenance
award to the shortest reasonable period of time to allow the recipient to
achieve employment in order to meet reasonable needs. 330 If a spouse is
unable to provide self-support because of mental or physical incapacity,
however, the award may continue for the duration of the incapacity or
indefinitely if its duration is not specifically terminated.331 If the cause of
disability is not related to the marriage, fastening a duty of support on the
other spouse is unjustifiable.
During the last century when the concept of requiring a former hus-
band to pay for maintenance of his former wife was developed, the law
ordinarily made an award to compensate for the husband's wrongful acts
during marriage, circumstances of marriage that benefited the obligor but
not the obligee, or acts that were detrimental to the obligee. In the past
allowing a spouse to recover for marital wrongs or deprivations has been
accepted in Texas only in relation to division of community property.
Since the abolition of the spousal tort immunity in 1977, a spouse may
recover for wrongs inflicted during marriage by the other spouse apart
from emotional distress negligently caused. If a policy of allowing recov-
ery for marital wrongs is a reasonable concept, to limit the award to a
particular period of time or marital or cohabital status in the case of post-
divorce maintenance seems contrary to the principles of our system of
justice.
F. PROPERTY UNDIVIDED ON DIVORCE
The former wife in Forgason v. Forgason332 brought suit for division of
community property left undivided on divorce in 1979. The property con-
sisted of benefits of a private pension plan of the ex-husband who later
retired in 1985. Prior to his retirement the ex-husband had arranged for
an annuity for his second wife and had thus reduced his own benefits.
The ex-husband died in 1991, when his second wife began to receive ben-
efits under the plan. The ex-wife sued the widow for a division of prop-
erty under sections 3.90 through 3.93 of the Family Code 333 but waived
any claim to benefits received by the ex-husband prior to his death. The
two-years statute of limitation under section 3.90 was not pled. Purport-
ing to act exclusively under section 3.91, the trial court exercised its dis-
cretion to award all the benefits to the widow. Although the appellate
court appreciated that the result was to deprive the ex-wife of her vested
interest in the community property, the court pointed out that the Texas
Supreme Court allows that result in authorizing discretionary disposition
330. Id. § 3.9605(a)(2).
331. Id. § 3.9605(b).
332. 911 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, n.w.h.).
333. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.90-3.93 (Vernon 1995).
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of community property on divorce. 334
G. CLARIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DIVORCE DECREES
Numerous disputes continue to arise in construing agreed orders for
divorce. In one instance after another the written expression, or incom-
plete expression, of the parties' intentions produces a later dispute. In
such instances the courts rely on the law of contracts to resolve the dis-
pute and hear evidence with respect to the parties' intentions.335 In Har-
vey v. Harvey336 the parties' agreed order for divorce had stated that the
wife was entitled to fifty-five percent of accrued benefits from the hus-
band's corporate pension plan, but the plan-administrators refused to ap-
ply the decree as a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) 337
because it did not specify whether the wife was entitled to the benefits of
a surviving spouse. On the basis of testimony adduced at the trial, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's clarifying order that included
survivorship benefits as being within the terms of the decree. 338 In Bina
v. Bina339 the parties' agreed order had failed to specify types of securi-
ties included within a general description of securities awarded to the
wife so that the order could be enforced by contempt. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's clarification of what it construed as an
ambiguous order expressing the parties' intent when there was no evi-
dence in the record to refute the trial court's conclusion. Again, in
Echols v. Echols340 the spouses' agreed order, which provided that the
husband would make an equal monthly division with his ex-wife of his
corporate retirement benefits, was clarified to provide arithmetically
equivalent benefits for the ex-wife after the ex-husband decided to take
all his benefits in a lump sum rather than in monthly payments. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the parties had
agreed to divide the benefits by halves however paid.341
In Dechon v. Dechon342 the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
court's clarification of the spouses' mutual mistake in their property set-
tlement agreement incorporated into their divorce decree. In the course
334. Forgason, 911 S.W.2d at 896 (citing Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.
1982)). Cf Mendoza v. Mendoza, 621 S.W.2d 420, 423 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1981, no writ).
335. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161, 1189 (1994).
336. 905 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, n.w.h.).
337. See text at notes 356-57 infra.
338. The 1995 enactment of TEX. FAM. CODE ANr. § 3.711 (Vernon Supp. 1996) allows
a suit to amend a QDRO. In Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 961 n.9 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1995, n.w.h.), the court noted that an order under section 3.711 is like a clarification
order under section 3.72 "as they both constitute prerequisites to enforcement rather than
methods of enforcement." The court in Dechon also supplies a very useful concise history
of Texas's decree-clarification process. Id. at 955-58.
339. 908 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.).
340. 900 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied).
341. Id. at 163.
342. 909 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
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of its opinion the court commented that section 3.70(C) 34 3 must apply to
"all methods of enforcement" whether the court acted under section 3.63
or section 3.631, 344 and "the method of enforcement sought" is irrele-
vant.345 The court further noted that no statute of limitation is applicable
to the clarification process itself, but once clarification is achieved, a lim-
ited period is applicable for achieving enforcement. 346
The time when a statute of limitation begins to run to preclude enforce-
ment was at issue in Dickey v. Dickey.347 In a divorce rendered in 1967,
the husband was ordered to maintain two policies of insurance on his life
in favor of his ex-wife. It was apparently not until after the ex-husband's
death in 1989 that the ex-wife learned that both policies had lapsed in the
early seventies. In 1991 the ex-wife brought suit against the ex-husband's
estate for her loss incurred by the failure of the decedent to comply with
the divorce court's order. In her motion for summary judgment, how-
ever, the plaintiff failed to assert when she had become aware of the lapse
of the policies. The appellate court held that a motion for summary judg-
ment should not have been granted without determining when the statute
of limitation would have begun to run against an action for non-compli-
ance with the judgment.348
In Day v. Day3 4 9 enforcement was sought of a 1989 divorce decree into
which the parties property settlement agreement had been incorporated.
The agreement provided that if particular conditions were not met by the
husband, the wife could foreclose a lien on certain properties. After the
conditions were not met, the ex-wife sought foreclosure of the lien. The
trial court dismissed her motion on the ground that enforcement was
barred by lapse of time from the entry of the decree. The appellate court
concluded that the limitation period did not begin to run until the ex-
husband had failed to meet the conditions prescribed and remanded the
case for trial.
The dispute concerning enforcement in Thomas v. Thomas350 arose out
of a property settlement agreement whereby the husband agreed to pay
his wife post-divorce alimony. The ex-husband ceased making payments
in 1991, and the ex-wife sued for payments due and damages for anticipa-
tory breach of the contract. The trial court awarded the recovery claimed
for arrears and found anticipatory breach of contract but awarded no
damages therefor. The ex-wife did not appeal. In 1993 she sued again for
subsequent failure to make alimony payments in accordance with the set-
tlement contract. The ex-husband responded with a motion for a declara-
tion by way of summary judgment, contending that the ex-wife's right had
343. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon 1993).
344. Id. §§ 3.63, 3.631.
345. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d at 961.
346. Id. at 955, 960, 962.
347. 908 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, n.w.h.).
348. Id. at 313.
349. 896 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, n.w.h.).
350. 902 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
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been determined in the prior suit for anticipatory breach. The trial court
rendered judgment in his favor. The ex-wife had made two serious mis-
takes: bringing suit for anticipatory breach in the first place and then fail-
ing to appeal after having been awarded no damage for the breach. 351
The appellate court relied on collateral estoppel as an alternative ground
for its conclusion. 352
Somewhere in legal classification between clarification and enforce-
ment (or perhaps beyond both), one might find a proper niche for Beach
v. Beach.353 While a suit for divorce was pending, the husband and wife
executed what was termed a "mutual release" from liability for any action
taken in connection with their proceeding by either of them or their legal
representatives. Anticipating that the ex-wife might sue him concerning
pleadings that he had filed in the divorce proceeding, the ex-husband's
counsel purported to intervene in the divorce case after entry of the de-
cree of divorce in order to enforce the decree and to seek a declaratory
judgment that the ex-wife had no cause of action against him. The ex-
wife then moved to dismiss the attorney's action and (true to anticipa-
tion) filed suit in another court against her former husband's attorney for
malicious prosecution and conspiracy. The ex-husband then filed a mo-
tion to enforce the decree and for a declaratory judgment that the ex-wife
had no cause of action against him or his counsel. The divorce court de-
nied the ex-wife's plea to the jurisdiction and her alternative pleas in bar
and entered a declaratory judgment that the ex-husband's counsel was
not liable to the ex-wife for any cause of action based on his representa-
tion of the ex-husband in the suit for divorce. On the ex-wife's appeal,
the court held that the attorney's intervention after the divorce was un-
timely and that his intervention (and that of his client, the ex-husband)
should have been stricken because the couple's release was not a part of
the divorce decree and could not be enforced through a motion to en-
force the decree.354 The appellate court held that the decree of the trial
court in favor of the post-divorce motions was a nullity and the interven-
tion should be dismissed.355
The Legislature provided in 1995 that if a qualified domestic relations
order (QDRO) is not entered on divorce, a QDRO may be entered at
some later time to clarify the final decree for the division of a pension or
other retirement benefit.356 If on divorce a QDRO was entered which
did not accomplish its purpose, that order may be later corrected to
achieve its purpose within the terms rendered by the divorce court.357
351. Id. at 625.
352. Id. at 626.
353. 912 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
354. Id. at 347-48.
355. Id.




H. EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
If the remedies sought in Beach cause the mind to wobble, the reader
needs some bracing before examining In re Davis.358 In 1968 the divorce
court awarded the wife support payments in accordance with the parties'
agreement. In 1987 the ex-husband and his new wife filed for bankruptcy
and their homestead and other exempt property was awarded to them.
The ex-husband also commenced an adversary proceeding against his for-
mer wife for a declaratory judgment that his indebtedness under the di-
vorce decree was discharged in bankruptcy. In 1991 the parties settled
that dispute, and an agreed money-judgment was entered for the ex-wife
with a declaration that the award was not dischargeable under section
523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.359 In 1993 the ex-wife filed an appli-
cation for a turnover order and other relief in aid of her judgment. She
asserted that she had been unable to collect the judgment from her ex-
husband, and that by using a Texas turnover order 360 the bankruptcy
court should require him to convey his homestead and to deliver certain
exempt personally to her in satisfaction of the judgment. The ex-wife
asserted that the Bankruptcy Code not only has the effect of making ex-
empt property available to discharge pre-petition family support obliga-
tions under sections 522(c)(1) 361 and 523(a)(5) 362 by way of federal
preemption but also allows the court to use the Texas turnover statute to
achieve that result. Without resolving the very difficult questions of inter-
pretation raised by the first assertion, her argument founders on the sec-
ond. Reiterating the conclusion reached by the bankruptcy judge, the
federal district court held that the Texas turnover statute does not have
the force ascribed to it.363 After an attempt at explaining the effect of the
references in section 522(c)(1) to sections 523(a)(1) and 523(a)(5) by say-
ing that "under Texas law, a homestead remains liable for debts of the
type specified .. .because liens may be perfected against the property
358. 188 B.R. 544 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995).
359. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
360. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986).
361. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (1988):
Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not
liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, or that is
determined under section 502 of this title as if such debt had arisen, before
the commencement of the case, except-(1) a debt of a kind specified in
section 523(a)(1) [federal taxes] or 523(a)(5) [alimony and child-support] of
this title ....
362. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). The individual debtor is not discharged from debts
"to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or
support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
or other order of a court of record.., or property settlement agreement .... See In re
Davis, 170 B.R. 892, 898 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994), commented on in Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1273
(1995). In In re Pate, 8 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rptr. 169 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995), the bankruptcy
court found that unpaid temporary alimony, unpaid mortgage payments ordered to be paid
as temporary alimony, and attorney's fees ordered to be paid by a divorce court were not
dischargeable under section 523(a)(5).
363. Davis, 188 B.R. at 550.
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[for that purpose]," 364 the federal District Court went on to suggest that,
by way of the reference in section 522(c)(1) to section 523(a)(5), the ex-
wife could have perfected a lien against the ex-husband's homestead by
abstracting her agreed money judgment. The court further stated that
"[i]n the absence of § 522(c)(1), a debtor could invoke the protection of
§ 522(f) to avoid the fixing of a lien on his exempt property for family
support obligations." 365
Although the ex-wife's first argument has been scarcely explored in
Texas,366 it is not untenable. But her proposed remedy is novel as well as
inappropriate, because a Texas turnover order is specifically made inap-
plicable to the seizure of exempt property. 367 A bankruptcy court should
nevertheless be able to fashion an appropriate remedy when called upon
to apply the provisions of section 522(c)(1) in relation to section
523(a)(5). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals should suggest a mode of
proceeding in the appeal of this case. A further question will have to be
resolved later: the effect of these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in a
non-bankruptcy context.
In the course of a marriage when there are both separate and conimu-
nity assets, it is common for benefits to be rendered by one marital estate
for another. When that situation occurs, the benefiting estate is said to
have an equitable claim for reimbursement against the benefited estate.
That claim is sometimes referred to as an equitable charge or equitable
lien. But such an equity is unenforceable until a court finds a right of
reimbursement. 368 When that finding is made, the right ceases to be a
mere equity and is enforceable like any other judicial order, though the
enforceable right is sometimes carelessly referred to as an equity as
though the judicial determination has not yet been made. Such casual
reference is made to liens put on various interests in personalty by a 1994
divorce decree in In re Levi.369
Rather than partition the community interests in various types of per-
sonalty between the spouses, the divorce court in Levi (perhaps in ac-
cordance with an agreement of the parties) awarded certain interests
amassed by the husband to him. The properties consisted of a partner-
ship interest, individual retirement accounts [IRAs], insurance policies on
the husband's life, and two retirement accounts. The court put a lien on
those accounts for a money judgment to the wife for an amount equal to
one half of the community interests therein, in disregard of the Texas
Supreme Court's observation in Jensen v. Jensen370 that money judgments
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See In re Meadows, 75 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
367. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986).
368. Even if a right of reimbursement arises by operation of law as in the case of a
purchase-money lien in McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984), the lien is
unenforceable until the amount of the claim is judicially fixed.
369. 183 B.R. 468, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995).
370. 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 139 (1984).
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rather than liens should be awarded in dealing with reimbursement inter-
ests in personalty. All the property interests here were clearly commu-
nity property except the life insurance policies that might have been
acquired by the husband before his marriage. If the court had merely
divided the community interests between the parties, the bankruptcy
court, whose protection the ex-husband sought after the divorce, would
not have been faced with the problems encountered. 371 But the divorce
court chose to proceed otherwise and in doing so fixed "liens" on exempt
property in all but two instances (the partnership interest and one of the
retirement trust accounts). With respect to the exempt properties the ex-
husband sought to remove the liens under section 522(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 372 In response to the ex-wife's assertion that the liens were
not "judicial liens" but "equitable liens," the bankruptcy court held that
for purposes of bankruptcy law the liens were "judicial", a matter to be
determined by federal law. 373 Indeed, if a lien had been judicially fixed, it
must have been a judicial lien.
The court then proceeded to characterize the pre-divorce interests in
the various items of personalty and then applied the rule in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot374 in declining to remove liens from the prior community
property ownership elements.375 With respect to the life insurance poli-
cies the court applied the community property presumption to reach the
conclusion that the policies were community assets in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary. 376 On the authority of Seaman v. Seaman377 the
court found that the lack of cash surrender value for the policies was not
determinative of their character and in the absence of any evidence of the
date of acquisition.
In In re Norton378 a divorce court had awarded the husband two com-
munity policies of life insurance on his life and fixed a "lien" on the poli-
cies to secure the ex-wife's compensating money judgment awarded to
her for her community interest in the policies. In a subsequent bank-
ruptcy proceeding, the authority of Farrey precluded the ex-husband's re-
liance on Section 522(f) to extinguish the ex-wife judicial lien on exempt
personalty.379
In Dawson-Austin v. Austin380 the wife had brought suit for divorce in
371. See In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986), commented on in Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV.
1161, 1195 (1994).
372. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
373. Levi, 183 B.R. at 471-72.
374. 500 U.S. 291, 300 (1991).
375. Levi, 183 B.R. at 472-73.
376. Levi, 183 B.R. at 473.
377. 756 S.W.2d 56, 56 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ). See Estate of Cavenaugh
v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 100 T.C. 407 (1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 51 F.3d 597
(5th Cir. 1995), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REv. 1225, 1238-40 (1995).
378. 180 B.R. 168 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
379. Id. at 169.
380. Dawson-Austin, 920 S.W.2d 776.
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California on April 10, 1992. The husband filed suit for divorce in Texas
on the following September 10 and the wife was served with process on
September 14. The husband was not served with process in the wife's suit
until October 14. Both suits proceeded to trial. The Texas appellate
court sustained the trial court's denial of the wife's plea in abatement to
the husband's suit for her lack of diligence in achieving service in her
California suit.381 On August 6, however, the California court had
granted the wife a divorce but made no division of property. In her Texas
appeal the wife asserted the applicability of section 3.91(b) 382 to require
division of the property by the Texas court in accordance with California
law under which court had rendered a final decree of divorce.383 The
appellate court pointed out, however, that because the wife had filed for
bankruptcy in California before the entry of the California divorce de-
cree, the California court did not have jurisdiction to make a property
division under section 3.91(b) because of the automatic stay imposed
under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.384 Thus, section 3.91(b) was
inapplicable to the division of the property when the California decree
was rendered, and after the automatic stay was lifted, the Texas court
proceeded to divide the property pursuant to either section 3.92(b) 385 or
3.63.386
381. Id. at 785-86.
382. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.91(b) (Vernon 1993).
383. Dawson-Austin, 920 S.W.2d at 787 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE § 4514 (recodified as
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2341 (Deering 1994))).
384. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
385. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.92(b) (Vernon 1993).
386. Id. § 3.63.
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